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Cross-Country Evidence from Micro Data
*
 
The transition process has had different distributional impacts across different interest groups 
and countries. These have led to differences in the support for transition. In this paper, we 
study support attitudes for both the economic and political transition using data from the New 
Barometer Surveys for 14 transition economies from 1991 to 2004. We document that the 
overall support is low and heterogeneous across countries and individuals. Support attitudes 
are lower among the old, less skilled, unemployed, poor, and those living in the CIS 
countries. There seems to be an increasing trend in the support for the economic transition in 
most countries. Our findings are robust to changes in the definition and measurement of the 
dependent variable. We also find evidence that transition-related hardship, opinions on the 
speed of reforms, political preferences and preferences towards redistribution, ideology and 
social capital matter. Finally, we show that individual preferences for secure jobs, the role of 
state and trust in politicians as well as better institutions, in particular, the quality of 
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1.  Introduction  
In the last two decades former socialist countries went through the unprecedented experience of a 
parallel transition to a market economy and to democracy. The implementation of political and economic 
reforms began in the early 1990s in most countries in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and in the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). However, the paths of reform implementation and the 
sequence of the reforms differed across countries – a difference which is sometimes exemplified in the 
distinction between a so-called “big-bang” approach and “gradualism”.
1  
The transition process has been characterized almost everywhere by an initial deep recession, which in 
many countries also involved widespread unemployment. However, the pattern, depth and duration of 
this transitional recession and the speed of the subsequent recovery differed considerably across 
countries with CEE countries, on average, recovering faster.
2 A common feature to all the transition 
economies was the need to refocus the orientation of international trade, to restructure internal 
production, and to reallocate labor across regions, sectors and firms (Campos and Coricelli, 2002). 
Privatization, trade liberalization, macroeconomic stabilization and economic restructuring took place in a 
situation of institutional change, where many institutions that had hitherto provided social protection 
collapsed and others, such as taxation or banking, had to be introduced practically ex novo. The initial 
stages of transition brought about remarkable increases in income inequality in all countries, including 
those that had managed to avoid large increases in unemployment rates (Milanovic and Ersado, 2008). 
One of the most important criteria for assessing the success of transition is a country’s achievement in 
reallocating labor (Boeri and Terrell, 2002). As transition generated an unprecedented economic 
insecurity, job insecurity became a crucial issue for many (Linz and Semykina, 2008). Low-educated, 
young, single individuals and women, especially married women, were more likely to become 
unemployed (Boeri and Terrell, 2002). Thus, transitional reforms soon produced both economic “winners” 
and “losers” (Brainerd, 1998; Terrell, 1999), and for those who were less ready or able to face these 
changes, the costs of transition may well have outweighed, at least for some time, its benefits.  
The adjustment patterns of the output and labor markets differed substantially between the CEE and CIS 
countries. With a few exceptions, all Central and Eastern European countries experienced a U-shaped 
pattern of GDP, a large fall in employment early in the 1990s and some decline in labor productivity 
leading to rapid structural change but also to high unemployment (with the exception of the Czech 
Republic), much of which was long-term. In contrast, the CIS countries typically faced a L-shaped pattern 
of GDP during the 1990s, relatively little decline in employment and a relatively small reallocation of 
labor. Here, however, there was a more pronounced deterioration in labor productivity and of real wages, 
as well as a significantly larger increase in inequality than in the CEE countries (Boeri and Terrell, 2002; 
                                                 
1 Although a simplification and generalization, these definitions are useful for a general description of the transition 
process. See, for example, Roland (2002) for a comprehensive discussion of the political economy of transition and 
a survey of studies on economic policy reform. Note that countries differed also in the initial conditions, a fact that 
must be taken into account when modeling the outcomes of transition. 
2 In fact, the relative output performance of transition countries has been the subject of much debate in the literature. 
Among the potential explanations of the diversity of outcomes are geographical factors (such as proximity to the 
EU), history (such as the length of time under Soviet rule or the degree of pre-socialism development of capitalist 




3 Overall, while the labor market adjustment process took the form of larger declines in 
employment in the CEE countries, it typically occurred through real wage declines in the CIS. And only as 
transition progressed, unemployment began to increase gradually also in the CIS countries (Svejnar, 
2002).  
The speed with which an economy restructures and destroys the old state sector jobs is a subject of large 
literature on the optimal speed of transition (see, for example, Boeri, 2000 for a review, and footnote 7). 
However, by focusing on speed and thus distinguishing between the “big bang” vs. “gradualism” 
approaches, this literature fails to explain the key differences in the adjustment processes in the CEEC 
and CIS (Boeri and Terrell, 2002). Alternative explanations relate the differences in performance to 
differences in institutions. In particular, social safety nets and non-employment benefits may have 
prevented the decline of wages in central and eastern Europe by setting floors to them (Boeri and Terrell, 
2002). In addition, in the CIS weaker legal systems and weaker enforcement of laws and regulations 
supported a profound lack of transparency and uncertain corporate governance, which in turn facilitated 
the spreading of corruption and rent-seeking behavior (Svejnar, 2002; Roland, 2002). In general, the 
existing literature stresses the need to take a political economy perspective in order to explain why 
different policy models were adopted by different countries. Moreover, it is desirable to incorporate non-
economic institutions into the analysis, such as governance, democracy, social norms and values, as well 
as the quality of laws and regulations (Roland, 2002). Our paper addresses these challenges. By focusing 
on individual attitudes towards transition, relating them to individual experiences and suggesting several 
potential explanations of the differences in these attitudes between the CIS and CEE countries, we 
provide evidence on the link between the outcomes of transition and the formation of support for it in a 
political economy framework.  
The recent performance of the transition countries has been characterized, at least until the recession of 
2008-2009, by strong economic growth and, for the new EU member states, by a decline in 
unemployment and convergence towards the EU institutions. Average economic growth has been 
accelerating in nearly all transition countries, averaging 5.9 percent in 2000 – 2007, up from only 1.1 
percent in 1995-1999.
4 On the other hand, the pace of reforms in 2007 was the slowest since the 
transition began (EBRD, 2007a). And, in a stark contrast with improving living standards, the recent 
EBRD Transition Report documents that there is a widespread dissatisfaction with the outcomes of 
transition (EBRD, 2007a). In 2007, 49 percent of respondents disagreed (and only 35 percent agreed) 
with the statement that the economic situation in their country today is better than around 1989, with 
similar numbers corresponding to the political situation (EBRD, 2007a; see also Guriev and Zhuravskaya, 
2009).  Countries with the largest proportion of citizens dissatisfied with the economic situation were 
Hungary (75 percent), Ukraine (70 percent), Kyrgyzstan (70 percent), Bulgaria (63 percent) and Moldova 
(61 percent) (ibid.). And also privatization, one of the most important transition reforms, receives low 
support, with over 80 percent of respondents willing to revise it (EBRD, 2007a; Denisova et al., 2007).  
It is not easy to disentangle whether this is due to a “fatigue for some countries following accession to 
the European Union, uncertainties over the chances of EU membership for those in the “waiting room” or 
                                                 
3 The high employment rates in some countries, such as Russia, could also reflect the movement of workers from 
stable full-time jobs to more insecure temporary or part-time jobs in the formal or informal sector (Linz and 
Semykina, 2008). 
4 EBRD (2007a). Data refer to 29 countries, 2006 and 2007 are estimated.  
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complacency brought on by the large oil and gas windfall” (EBRD, 2007a, p. vi). In general, it seems that 
there is a certain “transition fatigue” in the region, a discontent with the process of transition that could 
also be held responsible for the frequent changes of government in several countries in the recent years. 
Individual opinions and attitudes matter, and it is also likely that the ongoing economic and financial 
turmoil will further reinforce these negative feelings, as several countries in the region already face 
political instability and the Czech Republic, Hungary and Latvia experienced the resignation of 
governments at the beginning of 2009.  
As most transition countries have rapidly and convincingly adopted fully democratic institutions, 
especially in the CEE, the discontent of the “losers” (or the expectations of those who fear becoming 
such) can be expressed through the channels of representative democracy and of civil society. This may 
have several consequences: a slow down or temporary stop of the process of economic reforms (as in 
Fernandez and Rodrik, 1991); a reversal – through the electoral process - of the governing majority,
5 
and following that a reversal of the initial reforms, and an upsurge of populist and nationalistic ideas (as 
recently documented, e.g., by Rupnik, 2007 and Krastev, 2007).
6 Therefore, subjective well-being and 
public attitudes towards transition are important not only as a measure of utility (indeed, many recent 
studies on happiness show that), but they are also crucial for the design and implementation of policies.   
Indeed, a large theoretical political economy literature has shown that voters’ opinions are crucial for the 
successful implementation of reforms, and that interest group coalitions may influence or even reverse 
the reform process (see Roland, 2002 for a comprehensive discussion). Both ex-ante and ex-post political 
constraints are important, as feasibility constraints may prevent reforms from being accepted, while 
policy reversal can occur after reforms have been already implemented (ibid). In general, a reason why 
reforms might be reversed is that they are not the outcome of optimal planning under full-certainty. On 
the contrary, they are often adopted as part of a trial-and-error procedure under aggregate (as well as 
individual) uncertainty, and in the absence of credible compensating mechanisms for losers. Thus reforms 
may be resisted ex-ante even when they would be ex-post beneficial (Fernandez and Rodrik, 1991) or, 
when enacted, they may face ex-post political opposition from those who have experienced economic 
losses. Rodrik (1995) shows that as the probability of getting a job in the private sector declines, state 
sector workers become anti-reform and vote for higher subsidies. However, he also observes that 
unemployment may strengthen support for reforms in situations where everybody is experiencing very 
high unemployment. As Fidrmuc (1999) observes, it is likely that workers in the state sector and those 
already unemployed will support rapid reforms only at the outset of transition, and will vote for a 
reduction in the speed of reforms later. On the other hand, workers in the private sector always benefit 
from, and hence also always vote in favor of rapid reforms.
7 In general, this literature shows that reforms 
are endogenous to the economic outcomes of previous reforms, and in particular to their distributional 
                                                 
5 Kornai (2006) computes that, out of 38 elections that took place in 8 CEE countries between 1989 and 2004, in 30 
cases the result has been one of “electoral dismissal”. On the other hand, the political economy of discontent can 
take different routes in less democratic countries, such as several CIS. 
6 As the first author observes: “Populism is antiliberal but it is not antidemocratic. It gives voice to the losers of the 
reform” (Krastev, 2007, p. 60) 
7 In a parallel vein, but without entering into considerations of political economy, also Blanchard (1997) finds that 
there exist an optimal speed of mobility (rate of dismissals) from the state to the private sector that ensures a 
smooth transition to a market economy. If dismissals are either too fast or too slow then the process is endangered, 
and he argues that reforms may be reversed if economic gains do not accrue soon enough. He also argues that 
public support for reforms is U-shaped, following similar pattern in output and employment. Roland (2002) uses 
political economy considerations to argue for the importance of keeping unemployment as low as possible along the 
path of transition.  
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impact (Kim and Pirttilä, 2006). The link between outcomes and reforms depends, among other factors, 
on the degree of (democratic) support for the reforms, which in turn depends on the net benefit that 
each individual receives from their implementation. In this framework, it is important to analyze the link 
between individual economic and labor market characteristics and attitudes towards transition reforms.  
What determines these individual attitudes? Who is against transition? Are there differences across 
countries and institutions, or between the early and late stages of transition? Why is support for a system 
change lower in some countries than in others? These are the questions that we address in this paper.  
While several studies have touched upon these questions, the majority of them either uses aggregate 
level data or is limited to only one country or one year. In addition, many studies have used indirect 
measures of preferences, such as those based on voting behavior; when the direct measures are 
available, individual-level data are scarce. Moreover, voting preferences are imperfect measures of 
attitudes towards reforms: since institutions are different across countries, such indirect measures may 
reflect both attitudes and institutions (Scheve and Slaughter, 2001; Mayda, 2006).
8 In this paper we 
attempt to overcome these critiques by employing a unique data set of comparable surveys and using 
direct questions on attitudes towards economic and political systems in 14 transition economies over 
1991-2004. We also provide several explanations for the lower support attitudes in some countries. To 
the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first one that analyses these questions using individual level 
data in a cross-country framework for this time span. Our data cover the entire period from the beginning 
of transition up to the first Eastern EU enlargement. The surveys allow us to distinguish between 
attitudes towards the economic and the political systems. By using individual level data and controlling 
for country specific effects we also alleviate the endogeneity problems that are likely to be present in 
aggregate data (Landier et al., 2008). Finally, as the suddenness and spread of the transformation were 
to a large extent unexpected and certainly unprecedented, these questions may to some extent be 
analyzed in the context of a (quasi) natural experiment of reform adoption (see also Landier et al., 2008; 
Alesina and Fuchs-Schueldeln, 2007).
9 
The main results of our study are the following. First, we document that support for both economic and 
political transition is indeed low in 14 countries, with the lowest numbers being in the CIS. Nevertheless, 
support for change in the political system is larger than that for the economic system. Second, consistent 
with the existing literature, we find that support is lower among the old, less skilled, unemployed and 
poor. In the majority of countries, attitudes towards transition to a market economy were more negative 
in the earlier phases than in 2004. In general, there are large similarities in the attitudes towards the 
economic and the political system, but also some significant differences. Third, we also find evidence of 
the importance of additional individual experiences and values, such as economic hardship during the 
transition, opinions on the speed of reforms, political preferences and preferences towards redistribution, 
ideology and social capital. Fourth, the degree of trust in political parties and parliament, individual 
                                                 
8 A further difficulty arises in the context of transition and incomplete democracies, where people have not actually 
experienced the true “democracy” and “market economy”, especially at the beginning of transition. In this case it is 
misleading to ask their opinions on, or their degree of satisfaction with, these institutions explicitly, as that may 
lead to a substantial bias (Mishler and Rose, 2000a,b). The survey questions on which we focus in this paper are 
not subject to these shortcomings.  
9 A few socialist countries had, however, begun to adopt a set of more limited market oriented economic reforms 
before 1990. The foremost example (outside the sample of countries studied in this paper) is China, where reforms 
were started around 1978 (See e.g. Lin, Cai and Li, 2002), but also Yugoslavia had adopted a widely decentralized 
system of enterprise management since the 1970s.  
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preferences for state’s responsibility and state ownership and, most important, preferences for secure 
jobs seem to explain some differences in support attitudes between the CIS and CEE countries. Finally, 
we show that country-specific institutions matter, as the unequal provision of public goods, widespread 
inequality, but mostly the quality of governance contribute to explain the lower support for transition in 
the CIS countries. Overall, the main findings are robust to changes in the definition and measurement of 
the dependent variables. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the related empirical literature. 
Section 3 presents the data and discusses measurement issues, while the empirical model is presented in 
Section 4. The socio-economic determinants of the attitudes towards transition in 14 countries are 
examined in Section 5. Section 6 explores potential explanations for the lower support for transition in 
the CIS countries by analyzing the role of individual as well as of macro-economic and institutional 
variables. Section 7 concludes.  
 
2.  Related empirical literature  
Several empirical studies have analyzed the determinants of support for reforms in transition countries, 
using different definitions of support and in reference to different countries and years. The first strand of 
empirical literature employs aggregate macro-level data to analyze these questions. Fidrmuc (2000) 
shows with county-level data that high unemployment is associated with less support for market reforms 
(defined as voting for the pro-reform parties
10) in the Czech and Slovak Republics, Hungary and Poland. 
In contrast with the so-called responsibility hypothesis (when voters held the government responsible for 
the state of the economy), voters are found to be forward looking, since they support parties which they 
expect to deliver policies favorable to them. 
Hayo (2004) analyzes support towards market reforms and the creation of a market economy in CEECs 
using macro data as well as micro data. Using Central and Eastern Eurobarometer data for 1990-1996 he 
shows that in only half of the countries there is a majority that supports the adoption of a market 
economy. He also finds a strong negative relation between inflation and support for market reforms, 
while unemployment has no significant effect. There is also some evidence that high speed of 
privatization and higher inequality are negatively correlated with pro-reforms attitudes. At the micro-
level, the author finds a negative effect of unemployment on the support for market economy in 1995.  
Kim and Pirttilä (2006), similarly to Hayo (2004), combine Central and Eastern Eurobarometer data 
(1990-1997) with macro data. They find that support for reforms is related to two groups of variables: 
past macroeconomic performance, “ex-post political constraints” (income inequality and inflation) and 
“ex-ante political constraints” (expected individual performance during future reforms). Support for 
reforms, in turn, affects positively the progress in reforms (measured by an index of the level of 
structural reforms). The authors conclude that transition reforms are not an exogenous process; on the 
contrary, their adoption depends crucially on political economy considerations.     
                                                 
10 Tucker (2002) surveys 101 articles that study post-communist elections and voting in 16 political science and post-
communist area studies journals between 1990 and 2000 and reports that only 3 articles use individual data in 




Opper (2004) uses country-level data to analyze the determinants of progress in privatization in a 
political economy framework. She finds that financial constraints, distribution of political power and 
interest group pressure determine the progress in large-scale privatizations, but not in small-scale ones. 
In a cross-country study, Doyle and Fidrmuc (2006) analyze support for EU membership in candidate 
countries. They use both regional macro data and individual data from the Candidate Countries 
Eurobarometer for 2002. They find that regions with low unemployment and high wages show greater 
turnout to referenda (albeit not greater support). Surprisingly, they also find that those who are most 
likely to benefit from the redistribution funds of the EU (i.e. individuals living in poor regions and those 
less well off) were more likely to oppose their country’s membership or to abstain from voting in their 
countries’ referenda for accession. Conversely, those individuals who are more likely to benefit from the 
new economic opportunities – the young, educated, skilled and those relatively well off – also display 
more pro-EU attitudes. These are the same characteristics that other studies find to be positively 
correlated with support for market reforms. Thus, as the authors argue, the accession to the EU may be 
perceived as the final critical step of the post-communist transition. 
A recent paper by Landier et al. (2008) using World Value Survey data combined with country-level data 
investigates the determinants of and causes behind “capitalism aversion”, measured by attitudes towards 
private ownership, private profits and competition. The authors provide evidence for support of both the 
“self-interest” and “slow learning” hypotheses and also show that cultural factors matter. In addition, the 
paper also provides some evidence that pro-market opinions affect the nature of economic institutions.
  
Another strand of the empirical literature uses micro data to analyze individual preferences towards 
reforms in a single country. Doyle and Fidrmuc (2003) using survey data for the Czech Republic (1990-
1992 and 1993-1998) show that unemployment began to have an effect on voting in the Czech Republic 
during the later stages of transition, when winners and losers had already been identified. They also find 
support for the so-called “responsibility hypothesis” (that is, voters with low incomes or those living in 
areas with high unemployment show less support for the pro-reform parties). As both individual and 
regional unemployment variables are significant, they do not find conclusive evidence to discriminate 
between the so-called individualist versus sociotropic behavior, which is often analyzed in this sort of 
studies. In another study for the Czech Republic, Earle and Gehlbach (2003) analyze the role of 
privatization for individual attitudes towards economic reforms and democracy. Using data from the 
Survey of Economic Expectations and Attitudes from 1996, they show that receiving property through 
restitution and retaining shares acquired through the voucher program is strongly associated with 
support for reforms, while participation in voucher privatization had little impact. Moreover, the 
magnitudes of the impacts of privatization experiences were substantial, which suggests a significant 
impact of this policy design on citizens’ support for transition.   
Valev (2004) studies the effect of unemployment on voting behavior in Bulgaria and finds a small effect. 
Although high unemployment reduces somewhat the support for market reforms, in locations with high 
unemployment unemployed people demand more, rather than less, reform, which is consistent with the 
Rodrik’s (1995) hypothesis. In addition, Valev (2004) shows that many voters believed that high 
unemployment was a short-term cost necessary to implement market reforms, and that, accordingly, 
they voted for a pro-reform party. The author also argues that these results have important implications 
for the Optimal Speed of Transition literature, since voters supported rapid rather than gradual reforms.   
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Eble and Koeva (2002) provide evidence on the determinants of individual reform preferences in Russia 
after the August 1998 crisis, using Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey Round 8 data. The authors use 
two measures of preferences: opinions about the reform process in general and attitudes towards market 
reforms in particular. They confirm that individual attitudes towards reform are affected by individuals’ 
economic gains or losses during transition (the so-called “economic hypothesis”). They also find that 
some societal groups, such as younger individuals, are more flexible in adapting to changes than older 
individuals (the so-called “ideological hypothesis”). Finally, their findings show that local economic 
conditions matter: people who live in high-arrears regions are more likely to be against the reform 
process; and also the regional income level, ethnic composition, oil production and crime rates (but not 
the unemployment rate) exert a significant effect on reform attitudes.  
Jackson et al. (2003) analyze confidence in state firms vs. de novo private firms in Poland using both 
aggregate and survey data from three Polish elections. They show that support for pro-reform political 
parties is stronger for these private firms, for the individuals they employ and for the residents in areas 
where these firms are established. 
Finally, Denisova et al. (2007) analyze the determinants of opinions in favor of a revision of privatization 
in 28 transition countries in 2006 using individual-level data from the Life in Transition Survey. The 
authors find that respondents with less human capital, employed in less skilled jobs, older individuals, 
those with poorer health and with a vocational education degree are more likely to be in favor of revising 
privatization. In addition, significant and sustained economic hardships experienced during transition 
(e.g., food cuts, forced asset sales and wage cuts) are associated with greater support for revising 
privatization. They also find that the quality of institutions, such as governance, democracy and private 
ownership as well as income inequality affect the link between transition-related experience and support 
for the revision of privatization.
 11   
Related literature examines subjective well-being in transition countries. Blanchflower (2001) uses 
Central and Eastern Eurobarometer data to estimate wage curves and well-being regressions in 23 
transition countries over 1990-1997. He finds that happiness is, in general, low in these countries, and 
that satisfaction with democracy is U-shaped in age and is the lowest among the least educated, females, 
and the unemployed. He also analyzes attitudes towards market reforms and finds that support for these 
reforms followed a U-shaped pattern across years, and is lowest in the CIS countries, among the least 
educated, females and the unemployed and is U-shaped in age. Similarly, Sanfey and Teksoz (2007) 
using World Value Survey data find that individuals in transition economies have significantly lower life 
satisfaction compared with those in non-transition countries, and that in several countries life satisfaction 
has returned to the pre-transition levels after a drop in the mid-1990s. The authors find that people are 
in general happier in countries that have made more progress in transition and where inequality is lower. 
They also show that the most vulnerable groups include older individuals with obsolete skills and those 
with limited education. In addition, the self-employed have satisfaction levels as high as, or higher than, 
full-time employees, suggesting that entrepreneurship can be a rewarding option in transition. A recent 
paper by Guriev and Zhuravskaya (2009) using data from the World Value Survey and from the Life in 
Transition Survey arrives at similar conclusions. The authors also provide several reasons to explain why 
                                                 
11 Blanchflower and Freeman (1997) using ISSP data compare attitudes of workers in the former communist countries 
(Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, Russia and Slovenia) to those in Western countries. 
They find that citizens of ex-communist countries report a greater desire for egalitarianism, less satisfaction with 
their jobs, more support for trade unions and state intervention than do Western citizens.  
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life satisfaction is lower in transition countries. In particular, the depreciation of human capital, the 
deterioration of public goods, income volatility and social injustice are quite relevant in this context. Once 
these effects are controlled for and differences in samples are accounted for, the difference between 
transition and non-transition countries disappears. Easterlin (2008) also uses World Value Survey data 
and finds that life satisfaction has indeed followed the same U-shaped pattern as GDP in transition 
economies, but also that the recovery falls short of that of GDP by 1999. The largest loss in life 
satisfaction is experienced by less educated and older individuals. He also suggests that transition has 
raised satisfaction with material living levels, but has decreased satisfaction with employment, health and 
family security. 
Finally, the sources of popular support for political regimes in general and democracy in particular have 
been analyzed widely by political scientists using, among others, data from the World Value Survey and 
New Democracy Barometer (see, for example, Rose, 2007, Lazar, Mishler and Rose, 2007, Mishler and 
Rose, 2002, Mishler and Rose, 2000a and b). Their findings indicate that, in general, most of the variance 
in support for the new political regime may be explained by factors related to the economic and political 
performance, followed by the communist legacy. These studies also argue that citizens learn about the 
new regimes in both democratic and undemocratic countries, and that their assessments may change 
with the passage of time. One implication of this “lifetime learning model”, a political economy model of 
regime support (Mishler and Rose, 2002), is that, as time goes by, we should observe the emergence of a 
divide between citizens, according to their personal experiences and characteristics. Indeed, they also 
find that most vulnerable economic groups express less support for the new regime (Mishler and Rose, 
2008; Lazar, Mishler and Rose, 2007). Evaluations of the economic system and the political regime may 
also influence each other, while domestic economic conditions (GDP growth) and political institutions 
(civil and political liberties, the characteristics of the political and electoral systems) have a separate 
impact on these evaluations (Mishler and Rose, 2008). One interesting conclusion from these studies is 
that high support for the past regime is more likely to reflect a nostalgia for the past than a desire to 
abandon economic reforms and to return to communism, since the proportion of those willing to return to 
communist rule is low even among those individuals who rank the communist political regime favorably 
(Rose, 2007).
  
Our paper complements and adds to this literature in several ways. We analyze individual support for 
transition, controlling for a large array of individual characteristics, taking advantage of employing a 
unique large micro dataset which covers 14 transition countries over an extended period of time (1991-
2004), which we have merged with the corresponding macro-economic and institutional variables. We 
also distinguish between determinants of support for the economic and political system and attitudes for 
the current and the past systems. Finally, we document cross-country differences in the support for 
transition and, following the approach of Guriev and Zhuravskaya (2009), we test for potential 
explanations of these cross-country differences.  
 
3.  Data and descriptive evidence 
a.  Data and sample selection 
The individual data used in this paper come from the New Barometer Surveys (New Democracy 
Barometers). These are representative surveys of the populations in transition countries consistently  
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collected over time by the Centre for the Study of Public Policy (CSPP) at the University of Aberdeen and 
the Paul Lazarsfeld Society, Vienna (see Data Appendix for the data acknowledgements and citations).  
As each survey round contains a large number of common questions, which are maintained across time 
and countries, the set of available surveys constitutes a unique dataset that allows meaningful cross-
country comparisons across several years. This allows u s  t o  i d e n t i f y  t r e n d s  i n  p o l i t i c a l  a n d  e c o n o m i c  
transformations and also, given the composition of the questionnaires, to analyze the determinants of 
individual attitudes in the face of such changes. Surveys are undertaken independently from 
governments and face-to-face interviews are performed by trained interviewers working for established 
national research institutes in the national language (with the exception of the Baltic States, Belarus, and 
Ukraine, where Russian was also used). The survey includes nationwide multistage random samples of 
around 1,000 respondents per country (in Russia – around 2,000) over 18 years old.       
We have merged several waves of the New Europe Barometer, the New Russia Barometer and the New 
Baltic Barometer data. Our sample includes 14 transition economies, with the surveys taking place in 
several waves between 1991 and 2004. Ten countries in our sample became members of the EU with the 
2004 or 2007 enlargements (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania,  Poland, 
Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia), Croatia is currently a candidate for EU membership, while three 
countries are members of the CIS (Belarus, Russia and Ukraine). 
The set of explanatory variables employed in the regressions below includes standard socio-economic 
indicators used in the literature, such as gender, age, education, marital status, urban residence, 
employment status and household income. In addition, we have also collected data on macro-economic 
variables and political institutions. In the final sample we keep individuals with non-missing information 
on the key explanatory variables. Table A2 in the Appendix presents sample size by country. Definitions 
of the variables and details on the sources, usage and copyright of the data are given in the Data 
Appendix.  
In the survey, there are several questions which aim at representing the degree of individual support (or 
opposition) towards the process of transition. Some questions are focused on the present-day system, 
others on the past system, i.e. the planned economy or socialism. For the purpose of this paper we focus 
on the responses to the following sets of questions, which were included in all surveys:  
Economic evaluation: 
Q.1 “Here is a scale for ranking how the economy works (from +100 at top to -100).  
a)  Where on this scale would you put the socialist economy before the revolution of 1989 / 
perestroyka? 
b)  Where on this scale would you put our current economic system?” 
Political evaluation: 
Q.2  “Here is a scale for ranking how our system of government works  (from +100 at top to -100). 




b) Where on this scale would you put our current system (with free elections   
and many parties)?”
12  
As a first step, let us examine the patterns of responses to these questions across time and countries 
(see Figure 1 and Table A.1 in the Appendix).  
[Insert Figure 1] 
Figure 1 shows the proportion of positive, negative and zero evaluations of past and present economic 
(left panel) and political (right panel) systems for 1993 and 2004. Focusing first on the economic system 
reveals that a majority of respondents valued negatively the present system in 1993, while in 2004 a 
majority gave positive evaluations. Regarding the past economic system, a majority of respondents gave 
positive scores both in 1993 and 2004. For the political system the picture is somewhat different, as a 
majority of individuals evaluates positively both the past and the present system in both years, and 
interestingly the proportion of positive answers increases by 2004. Note also that zero evaluations 
constitute only a small proportion in the overall poll. Looking in more detail at each country (Table A.1), 
the following trends can be identified. First, at the beginning of the period (1991/93) in most countries 
the average evaluation of the present economic system was negative (13 countries vs. 1 - the Czech 
Republic). By the end of the period (2004), the odds were almost even (8 negative versus 6 positive), 
but in the meanwhile a considerable revision of the past had taken place. While at the beginning of the 
period, evaluations of the past economic system were on average positive in 9 countries, by 2004 this is 
true for 13 countries (the Czech Republic being the only one with a negative evaluation).  
Second, evaluations concerning the present political system, on the contrary, are on average positive 
since 1991/1993. In addition, out of the five countries where a majority of responses was initially 
negative, four were at that time non-democratic (or non fully democratic): Belarus, Croatia, Russia and 
Ukraine. Moreover, the number of countries with positive attitudes towards the present political system 
has increased in 2004 (11 versus 3), but at the same time (in 2004) the number of positive assessments 
of the previous political system has also increased (again: 11 versus 3).  
 
b.  How to measure support for transition? 
In principle, there are several alternative ways in which the evaluations presented in the previous 
paragraph can be used to formulate an appropriate dependent variable for our analysis. For instance, 
should we focus only on individual judgments about the present system? Or instead on a comparison 
between the evaluations for the present and the past? Intuitively, being interested in modeling the 
support for transition, a relative measure seems to be more appropriate, as it directly reflects support for 
the current system relative to the past one. Moreover, the answer to these questions is related, inter alia, 
to whether the revision of opinions about the previous regime reflects a (selective) forgetfulness of the 
past or a delusion about the present or, indeed, a mixture of both. Our a priori is that judgments about 
the past are meaningful, and that evaluating the past more favorably is part of the same process that 
results from a delusion about today’s experience. Accordingly, a judgment about the past is not only a 
historical assessment, but it also conveys information about the evaluation of the present system. In 
other words, statements about the past and the present are not independent of each other, but rather 
                                                 
12 Note that the questions have been framed in accordance with country-specific situations. For example, “free 
elections and many parties” are not mentioned in the Russian questionnaire, and the questions are only about “the 
current political system” and the economic or political systems “before perestroyka”.  
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reinforce each other. One way to take this into account is to compute our dependent variable by taking 
the difference (or “distance”) between the responses to Question b (present) and to Question a (past) for 
the economic and political systems evaluations, respectively. Thus, a larger positive (negative) difference 
implies a larger positive (negative) assessment of the present regime relative to the former one (in the 
economic or governmental dimensions, respectively). The larger this distance, the more an individual is 
positive about the current state of the economy or polity relative to the past, and thus, we assume, the 
more supportive he or she is for transition and for the reforms that have been adopted.  
In this context, note that differences in responses across countries may also arise due to different 
interpretations of the reference scale (-100;+100) in different countries and by different individuals, as 
they may be related to country-specific factors, such as culture. To this aim, we also standardize our 
dependent variable dividing it by its country (and year) specific standard deviation and control for 
country-specific effects in the regressions below.
 In this way we weight individual responses by a country 
and year specific variance, thus giving more weight to countries with relatively homogenous responses. A 
related problem that arises when using subjective data is that individual responses may be affected by 
several factors, such as the ordering or the exact wording of the questions or individual differences in the 
perceptions of the scale, which may introduce a measurement error into individual attitudes (Bertrand 
and Mullainathan, 2001). Note that the questions on the economic and political systems in our survey are 
usually asked at the beginning of the corresponding sections on the economy and public affairs, before 
the questions on the personal (or family) economic situation or on political preferences. Note also that 
taking differences across individual answers for the same person may difference away such individual-
specific and evaluation-invariant factors as pessimism or different individual perceptions of scale, thus 
potentially reducing the biases associated with it.
 13 
A final criticism, using the distance variable, is that it does not take into account whether the absolute 
evaluations of the present or the past are positive or negative. In section 4 we will test the robustness of 
our results also in this respect. 
[Insert Figure 2] 
Before proceeding to a more formal analysis, let us take a further look at the evolution of the support 
variables across time and for the individual countries. Figure 2 shows the developments over time of the 
support for the present and past systems as well as the corresponding “distance”. Support for the past 
economic system is quite high across 1991-2004, while it is much lower for the past political system (and 
is negative at the beginning of the 1990s). There is also an increase over time in the ranking of both past 
and present systems. Moreover, the support for the past economic regime is always higher than for the 
present economy, while the difference between the evaluations of past and present political systems is 
large in 1991, but small from 1992 onwards. As a result, our “distance” measure has a U-shaped profile 
for the economic system, while for the political system it decreases until 1998 and increases rather slowly 
afterwards. The U-shaped pattern in the support for economic transition seems to be in line with the 
Blanchard’s hypothesis and several studies mentioned above. However, only in a few countries it follows 
the development of GDP over time (see Appendix Figure A1). It is also worth noting that the support for 
                                                 
13 In general, we have extensively tested the sensitivity of our main results to alternative definitions of the dependent 
variable. To this purpose, we have used as a dependent variable non-standardized distance and have experimented 
with individual evaluations of only the present or the past economic or political systems. In addition, we have used 
responses to a question which was asked at the end of the interviews (see below).  Overall, our main results were 
robust to changes in the definition of the dependent variable.  
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change in the political system (“distance”) is larger than for change in the economic system. This is 
consistent with the political economy approach that suggests that more popular reforms should be 
implemented first, and with the observation that democratic reforms preceded economic reforms in all 
Central and Eastern Europe, since support for democracy was larger than for economic reforms (Roland, 
2002).  
As these aggregate changes may be driven by changes in the composition of countries in our sample 
throughout the period, in Figure 3 we plot the evolution of “distance” in different countries. In general, 
this figure confirms the previous observations. It also shows that the Czech Republic is the country with 
the largest support for both the economic and political transition, while Ukraine is the country with the 
lowest support.
14 Figure 3 also suggests that support for the economic transition is increasing in most 
countries, while support for the political transition is either constant or even decreasing. 
[Insert Figure 3] 
Another way to look at these evaluations is to adopt a classification developed by political scientists that 
is available in our dataset. The classification is explained in Table 1a, and it is used in Table 1b to classify 
the countries according to country averages. Again, the results are quite striking: the Czech Republic is 
the only consistently “pro-market” and “pro-democracy” country. Regarding the economic system, most 
countries are, on average, either “negative” or “nostalgic”. Only a few are “positive”, meaning that 
citizens give a positive evaluation to both the socialist and the market economy. For the political system, 
similarly, in the majority of countries, the responses are either “reactionary” or “compliant”. 
[Insert Table 1a and Table 1b] 
These preliminary findings also suggest that there might be some correlation between the attitudes 
towards the economic and the political system. Table 2 shows that this is indeed the case: for instance, 
while among all respondents those who are “nostalgic” about the socialist economy represent 43 percent, 
among those who are politically reactionary the proportion of “nostalgic” individuals is 81 percent.  
[Insert Table 2] 
Summing up, on average, citizens do not seem to give a favorable evaluation for the economic system 
they live in, and they seem to have regrets for the past. On the other hand, on average, they appear to 
be reasonably satisfied with the present political system, but in some instances they still do not see it as 
an improvement over the past. This is true, in particular, for the current CIS members, but also several 
other countries, such as Hungary, Slovakia, Slovenia, Latvia, Bulgaria and Croatia express a negative 
evaluation of the political “distance” in 2004. These findings, however, should not be interpreted as 
reflecting a desire to return to Communism, as among the respondents who give positive evaluations to 
the past economic or political system, only about 30 percent would actually agree to “return to 
communist rule”. The fact that the support for transition is quite low may appear somewhat puzzling, at 
least prima facie, if we compare these responses with the evolution of most standard macroeconomic and 
institutional indicators, especially in the new EU member states. Most indicators show a consistent 
improvement across time in all countries (see Appendix Table A.4), although there are some exceptions, 
                                                 
14 The highest support in the Czech Republic is remarkably consistent with one of the “political economy puzzles in 
Central Europe” (Roland, 2002, p. 44), namely, the higher stability of the government of Vaclav Klaus in the Czech 
Republic (until very recently), compared with governments in other transition countries; the fact that the Czech 
Republic has managed to maintain lower unemployment rates could be one of the potential explanations.  
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as Gini inequality index, Governance Indicators and life expectancy have indeed deteriorated in several 
countries. These aggregate differences, however, may be confounded by differences in individual 
characteristics and transition experiences. Moreover, country-specific macroeconomic policies and 
institutions may also affect the individual support for transition. We examine the role of these factors in 
the sections below. Although we cannot interpret these as causal relationships, documenting the role of 
these factors in a descriptive manner provides a useful picture of the situation in these countries and 
sheds additional light on the overall political economy of transition. 
 
4.  The empirical model 
We model individual support for the economic or political transition assuming that it may be influenced by 
three sets of explanatory variables. First, individual socio-economic characteristics matter as “winners” 
(also potential) are more likely to support the transition process, while “losers” are less likely to support 
it. Second, ideology, individual preferences and values (usually unobservable) may also influence 
individual support for transition. Note that controlling for ideology and transition-related experiences may 
alleviate the omitted variables problem as these variables could potentially confound the results. On the 
other hand, individual values and preferences are subjective measures themselves and thus are likely to 
be endogenous, i.e. shaped by individual socio-economic characteristics, the performance of the system 
and the inherited individual culture. Therefore, caution is needed when interpreting the results from the 
regressions that include such subjective measures. Nevertheless, it is interesting to explore the 
correlation between these variables and support for transition. Third, country-specific indicators for 
economic performance and institutions are also likely to be correlated with individual support for 
transition.  
We begin with the following simple baseline specification:  
ijt jt ijt ijt X Y ε δ β + + =            ( 1 )  
were  ijt Y  is our support for transition measure of individual i in a country j in year t,  ijt X  is a vector of 
standard individual socio-economic and demographic characteristics,  jt δ  are the interactions between 
country-specific and year fixed effects and  ijt ε  is a random error term, which ideally should not be 
correlated with the rest of the variables. Incorporating into this simple model a set of variables reflecting 
individual (subjective) preferences and values leads to the following more general specification:   
ijt jt ijt ijt ijt V X Y ε δ ϕ β + + + =           ( 2 )  
where  ijt V  includes subjective perceptions and preferences for political regimes, redistribution of income 
etc. As discussed above,  ijt V  may in turn be affected by individual characteristics as follows: 
ijt jt ijt ijt ijt d Z bX V η γ + + + =           ( 3 )   
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where  ijt Z  now includes the inherited or predetermined (“cultural”) components of values and 
preferences, and  ijt η  is a random error term. This system of equations generates the following reduced 
form: 
ijt jt ijt ijt ijt E D Z BX Y + + Γ + = '         ( 4 )  
where  b B ϕ β + = ,  ϕγ = Γ ,  ijt ijt ijt E ϕη ε + = , and  Z Z ⊆ ' . 
Thus, the parameters estimated in equation (4) have to be interpreted with caution, since the estimates 
are certainly not structural. In addition, several variables in  ijt X  are also likely to be endogenous, as 
there may still exist unobservable individual characteristics that affect both attitudes towards transition 
and, for instance, education, labor force status or household income. Having repeated cross-sectional 
data unfortunately precludes us from accounting properly for individual-specific effects. In Section 5b, we 
employ equation (2) and include directly variables measuring explicit values and preferences into the 
model. Although, again, these variables are endogenous, it allows us to measure the correlation between 
support for transition and preferences for redistribution or trust in political institutions, which is 
interesting per se. Overall, although it is difficult to draw causal inferences, after having controlled for 
individual characteristics and preferences as well as for country-specific effects and trends, the results 
are at least suggestive and provide a descriptive picture about the “winners” and “losers” from transition. 
Finally, in Section 6 we introduce macro-economic and institutional variables into our baseline model in 
order to capture country-specific performance and institutions as well as to assess whether they 
contribute to explaining the lower support attitudes in the CIS countries:  
ijt t j jt ijt ijt W X Y ε ϕ µ θ β + + + + =          ( 5 )  
where  jt W  are country-specific variables that vary over time,  j µ  are time-invariant country fixed effects 
and  t ϕ  are year fixed effects.  
We use the standardized “distance” measure as the dependent variable for the reasons discussed above, 
but also experiment with modeling the evaluations of the past and present systems separately. In Section 
5a below, we first estimate equation (1) for economic and political support attitudes separately by OLS 
(Tables 3 and 4), and then re-estimate this model allowing for the correlation between the two 
dimensions (Table 5). We also perform several sensitivity checks in order to explore the robustness of the 
definition of our dependent variable (Tables 6 and 7). Additional objective variables and subjective 
preferences are included into our model in Section 5b (Tables 8 and 9). Country-specific regressions are 
analyzed in Section 5c (Tables 10 and 11). Finally, we explore potential explanations for the lower 
support for transition in the CIS countries, including macro-economic variables and institutions, in Section 
6 (Tables 12, 13, 14). 
 
5.  Who is against transition?  
a.  Determinants of support for change in the economic and political systems   
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The transition process has generated economic “winners” and “losers” from transition (Brainerd, 1998, 
Terrell, 1999). It is likely that those who have not benefited from or could not adapt to the changing 
environment would express lower support for transition. For example, in line with the literature, older 
individuals, women and those unemployed and with obsolete skills can be expected to oppose the 
transition reforms because of the decreased social security and increased unemployment risks. It is also 
likely that individuals who had experienced the labor market under socialism will have different support 
attitudes in comparison to the younger cohorts. On the other hand, young, educated and more wealthy 
individuals are likely to support the transition process as potentially they may benefit or may have 
already benefited from the new opportunities, including those in the labor market that have been brought 
about. Finally, individuals’ experiences during transition, such as economic hardship, influence their 
subjective wellbeing (Guriev and Zhuravskaya, 2009), and thus are also likely to affect their evaluations 
of the transition.      
Table 3 reports the baseline equation (1) estimates for the evaluations of the economic system, and 
Table 4 shows the analogous regressions for the political system. In both tables, the dependent variable 
in column (1) refers to the evaluations of the past system, in column (2) the present system, and in 
columns (3) and (4) to their “distance”. While in column (3) we control for separate country and year 
fixed effects, in column (4) we include the full set of country-year interactions as specified in equation 
(1). In general, we expect that those individual characteristics that affect positively (negatively) the 
evaluations of the past, should also affect negatively (positively) the evaluations of the present and also 
their “distance”.  
[Insert Table 3 and Table 4] 
Let us first focus on the support for the economic transition (Table 3, columns 3-4). Several individual 
characteristics significantly affect the support attitudes. In particular, females seem to discount the 
present versus the past more than males, and age, education, urbanization and income also matter. In 
general, these results are consistent with the “losers vs. winners” approach and confirm that support for 
transition is lower among the old, unemployed, less educated individuals, those living in rural areas and 
having the lowest household income. Note, in particular, that having a university degree increases 
standardized “distance” by roughly 0.30 points,
15 and so does belonging to the 4th (upper) income 
quartile, while being unemployed decreases it by 0.16-0.17 points.
16 Regarding age, being older at the 
time of the interview is in general related to lower support for transition, relative to individuals younger 
than 29 years old. In addition, there is a separate effect of belonging to a young cohort, i.e. being 18 
years old or younger in 1990 (and thus presumably not having experienced the labor market under 
socialism), which increases support for transition by 0.09 points. Coefficients on country-specific effects, 
in general, confirm the descriptive evidence from Figure 3. Relatively to Slovenia, individuals in the Czech 
Republic, Poland and Croatia are significantly more positive about transition, whereas those in the CIS 
countries are most negative ceteris paribus (see column (3)). There seems also to be an increasing trend 
in support for change in the economic system, with support being, in general, higher in 2004 than in 
1990s. Note also that despite the introduction of the country-year interactions, the sign and significance 
                                                 
15 Notice that while present and past have unit variance by construction, their difference (distance) does not possess 
this propriety, so we cannot interpret these coefficients in percentage points of a standard deviation. 
16 To make the quantitative interpretation more intuitive, the corresponding numbers for the unstandardized distance 
measure are around 20 and 12 points, respectively, on a scale ranging from -200 to +200.  
 
16
of the individual characteristics remain generally unchanged.
17  The evaluations of the political system 
(Table 4) give very similar results, with the exception of the pensioner variable, that is no longer 
statistically significant, and city residence, that becomes marginally significant, while the dummy for 
Romania becomes positive. In addition, there is no evidence of the increasing trend in support for the 
political transition. However, it should be noted that time dummies in these regressions have to be 
interpreted with caution, since the composition of the sample with respect to countries changes 
throughout 1991-2004. It is, therefore, difficult to interpret them consistently in a comparative way 
across the whole period, and a separate analysis on a country-by-country basis is needed (see Section 
5c).
18 
In columns (5) and (6) we restrict the sample of observations in several ways in order to get a better 
“feel” for the appropriateness of our chosen dependent variable. Column (5) shows that our results are, 
in general, sharper when we limit the sample to the two extreme subgroups of “nostalgic” 
(“reactionaries” in Table 4) and “pro-market” individuals (“democrats” in Table 4). Note that the overall 
fit of the model is also better in these regressions. If instead we only look at the “pro-market” 
(“democrat” in Table 4) group, most individual characteristics are not significant. Overall, the results in 
columns (5) and (6) seem to suggest that the relative support for transition is mainly driven by the 
contrast between those individuals who are “nostalgic” about the past (or “reactionary”) and those who 
are “pro-market” (or “democrat”). This, in general, reinforces our interpretation of the dependent 
variable.
19 
An additional concern with individual evaluations of the aggregate economic or political system is that 
individuals may value differently changes in their own or family economic situation and changes in the 
country’s economic situation. To obtain additional insights on this issue, we have re-estimated the 
baseline equation of Table 3 for five different sub-groups. These were selected on the basis of their 
responses to the following question:  
“When you compare the overall economic situation of your household with what it was before the big 
transformation in the economy, would you say that in the past if was: much better / a little better / about 
the same / a little worse / a lot worse?”
20  
Indeed, as it is shown in Figure 4, those who report that their family economic situation is worse now 
than it was in the past, give consistently lower ranking to the overall country’s economic transition. In 
general, the effect of individual characteristics on the support for economic change does not change 
much between the five groups (not reported here, but available upon request). However, it is interesting 
                                                 
17 Interaction terms are in general significant (not reported, but available on request). 
18 Since our dependent variable is, in principle, ordered it is also possible to estimate the ordered probit model. We 
have estimated such model, coding our „distance“ measure into four ordered categories (from -200 to -100, from -
100 to 0, from 0 to +100, from +100 to +200). The qualitative results were identical (available upon request). 
However, since the quantitative interpretation is somewhat more complicated in this model, we have decided to 
present the results for the OLS. 
19 We have also estimated the baseline model keeping in our sample only those individuals who were older than 18 
years of age in 1990, since they have had an experience of the old system and thus can compare it directly with the 
new one. The estimates of the rest of the coefficients remained unaffected (with the only exception of the student 
variable that became insignificant in the equation for the political transition). In addition,  we have experimented 
with excluding Russia or Belarus from the sample, and the main results remained qualitatively the same (all results 
are available upon request). 
20 Note that in some countries and some years this question was asked in reference to “five years ago” rather than  to 
the period before the transformation.  
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to observe that, for the group that thought that the past was “a lot worse”, being unemployed (being in 
the highest household income quartile) lowers (raises) by a considerable amount their evaluation of the 
change. People who think that in the past it was worse are most probably expecting the largest positive 
changes, so they are likely to react more strongly to either the disappointment of being unemployed, or 
to the benefit of having a large income. Overall, these additional results suggest that the evaluation of 
economic transition does not reflect only or predominantly the subjective experience of the interviewees, 
as measured by the economic situation of their household. 
[Insert Figure 4] 
The results from the baseline models in Tables 3 and 4 suggest that individual evaluations of the 
economic and political system are related in the same way to the same set of individual characteristics. 
That is, it is likely that individual evaluations of the economic and political systems are correlated. 
Indeed, the raw correlation between these two outcomes is high and equal to 0.63. Table 5 reports 
estimates of the baseline equations, allowing for correlated errors across equations and using the 
seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) method. Overall, the results from OLS estimates are generally 
confirmed, although there is now some gain in efficiency for individual coefficients. 
[Insert Table 5] 
As was discussed in Section 3, it is not clear a priori whether absolute judgments expressed about the 
present or the past system are a suitable measure of the support for transition, or whether instead one 
should focus on the relative measure, i.e. comparing present versus past judgments. Indeed, as was 
mentioned in Section 3b, another potential criticism against using the distance measure is that it does 
not take into account the “absolute” evaluation of the current or of the past systems given by the 
respondents. For instance, the same distance of 70 could characterize someone who likes both the past 
and the present (past = 30; present = 100), someone who dislikes them both (past= -100; present = - 
30) and someone who dislikes the past but is reasonably satisfied with the present (past = -40; present 
= 30). As these absolute evaluations might contain additional information, we have used the 
classification in Table 1 proposed by political scientists to divide our sample in eight different sub-groups, 
four for the evaluation of the economic system and four for the political system. Which characteristics 
account for individual respondents placing themselves in any of these groups?  To address this question, 
in Table 6 we report the marginal effects from the multinomial logit regressions for “positive”, “pro-
market” and “nostalgic” groups relative to the “negative” group for the evaluation of the economic 
system (columns 1-3) and for “compliant”, “democrat” and “reactionary” groups relative to the “skeptic” 
group for the political system (columns 4-6).  
[Insert Table 6] 
Several interesting facts emerge from this table. First, only few individual characteristics are significant 
for the “positive” and “compliant” groups. Second, the impact of individual characteristics on the 
likelihood of being “pro-market” and “democrat” is qualitatively opposite to the impact for “nostalgic” and 
“reactionary” groups. For instance, the likelihood of being “pro-market” (see column 2) is significantly 
lower for females, unemployed and pensioners and is decreasing with age. On the other hand, university 
graduates are 7 percentage points more likely to be “pro-market” relative to those with elementary 
education, and so do individuals from the highest household income quartile. Looking at the political 
system and, again, focusing on the group of those who support the change to the new system (i.e.  
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“democrats”, column 5), we find a very similar impact of individual characteristics, with the exception of 
the urbanization and pensioner variables that become insignificant. On the other hand, several 
characteristics have a stronger effect on political attitudes. For example, university graduates are, on 
a v e r a g e ,  1 2  p e r c e n t a g e  p o i n t s  m o r e  l i k e l y  t o  b e long to the “democrat” group, while females or 
unemployed are, on average, 4 percentage points less likely to belong to this group
21  
Overall, the results from the multinomial logit analysis reinforce those from the OLS regressions above. 
Individual characteristics shape the pattern of individual evaluations regarding the economic and political 
system in a strong and plausible way. Country effects are also large and consistent across different 
specifications. Most important, this analysis shows that those characteristics that determine individual 
li k el ih oo d to be lon g  to  a  “pr o- m ar k e t” g r ou p g o i n  th e  s am e  di r e c tio n  a s tho se  th a t d r iv e  hi s o r he r 
attitudes towards support for transition. In other words, those who have lower support attitudes are, 
consistently, less likely to belong to the “pro-market” groups, and vice versa.
22 Therefore, this validation 
exercise adds credibility to the interpretation of the OLS regressions as modeling support for reforms or, 
at least, for transition.   
Finally, before moving to the next section, several additional sensitivity checks were undertaken and are 
reported in Table 7. First, we have estimated the baseline models for the economic and political system 
using the non-standardized distance as a dependent variable (see columns (1) - (4)). In general, the 
results are qualitatively unchanged and can be interpreted quantitatively now in terms of the 
corresponding points on the scale from -200 to +200. Second, we have used a different binary dependent 
variable that is equal to 1 if an individual agrees with the statement “We should return to Communist 
rule”. In general, the characteristics that affect positively (or negatively) the probability of agreeing with 
this statement are the same as those that decrease (or increase) support for transition in Tables 3 and 4.  
[Insert Table 7] 
Summing up this section, we find robust evidence that support for both economic and political transition 
is lower among older individuals, unemployed, less educated, and those living in rural areas or belonging 
t o  t h e  l o w e s t  h o u s e h o l d  i n c o m e  q u a r t i l e s .  W e  a l s o  d o c u m e n t  t h a t  s u p p o r t  i s  t h e  l o w e s t  i n  t h e  C I S  
countries. Different definitions of the dependent variable add credibility to interpreting the overall results 
as modeling support for transition. Consistent with the existing literature, our results indicate that the 
support for transition is indeed low among those who are likely to having lost from it. Note, however, that 
although the same individual characteristics that determine lower support attitudes for transition also 
affect the willingness to return to communism, the low average support for the new regime relative to the 
old one does not necessarily imply that a large proportion of individuals would actually like to “return to 
Communist rule” (see above and Rose, 2007). There is also considerable heterogeneity across countries 
in support attitudes as suggested by large and significant country-specific effects. In addition, in order to 
identify trends in these attitudes, one would need to undertake a country-specific analysis, since the 
composition of the countries’ sample changes throughout the period. We turn to such analysis in Section 
5c.    
                                                 
21 When estimating this model with country-specific effects and year dummies, the results were similar to those 
previously identified, with the Czech Republic having the largest positive effect and the CIS countries having the 
largest negative effect, and the probability to belong to the “pro-market” group being lower in 1990s than in 2004.   
22 To make this statement more clear, consider as an example the fact of being unemployed. Our results suggest that 
this: (i) will lower the probability of being “pro-market”, (ii) will increase the probability of being “nostalgic”, and (iii) 
will also decrease the overall support for transition, i.e. our “distance” measure.  
 
19
b.  The impact of additional characteristics 
Before turning to a country-specific analysis, however, it is important in these kinds of studies to properly 
control for heterogeneity in (usually unobserved) individual preferences, transition experiences and 
ideology. In this section, we exploit the richness of the data at our disposal and attempt to control for 
these additional characteristics. 
As noted above, having experienced individual hardship during the transition process may influence 
individual happiness (Guriev and Zhuravskaya, 2009) and thus individual evaluations of the relative 
performance of the economic and political systems. Another potential variable that is likely to be 
associated with individual evaluations of reforms is the speed with which the reforms were actually 
implemented. As suggested in the literature on the “Optimal Speed of Transition” (Aghion and Blanchard, 
1994) and on the desirable sequencing of reforms (the “big-bang vs. gradualism debate”, see, e.g., 
McMillan and Havrylyshyn, 2004,  Murphy, Schleifer and Vishny, 1992 and Roland, 2002), reforms can 
either (be perceived to) go too fast or too slow, and in each case the individual assessment of the 
economic and, possibly, of the political process would become more unfavorable. The extent of corruption 
in a country may also confound our results, since it may negatively affect individual attitudes towards the 
process of reforms in general. As communism is believed to have shaped cultural preferences towards 
redistribution (Alesina and Fuchs-Schundeln, 2007), it is likely that such preferences may in turn be 
correlated with individual attitudes towards transition from communism. In general, in this literature it is 
important to properly control for the role of ideology and political preferences, as these definitely affect 
individual attitudes towards transition from communism. Finally, following the literature on the 
importance of “informal” institutions and of social capital, we have also experimented with including 
d i f f e r e n t  m e a s u r e s  o f  t r u s t .  N o t e ,  h o w e v e r ,  t h a t  a s  d i s c u s s e d  a b o v e ,  m a n y  o f  t h e s e  v a r i a b l e s  a r e  
subjective measures and many (if not all) are likely to be endogenous. Nevertheless, even interpreting 
them as correlations provides additional useful insights. 
[Insert Table 8 and Table 9] 
Tables 8 and 9 show the estimation results when we introduce these variables into our baseline model. 
First, to proxy for individual hardship experienced during the transition, we construct two indicators, both 
of which refer to the year previous to the interview. The first variable (see column 1 in both Tables), 
measures the total number of weeks during which a person was either unemployed, was not paid full 
salary or during which a payment was delayed. The second variable (see column 2), is a so-called 
destitution scale, constructed on the basis of several responses to more specific questions in order to 
reflect the frequency with which a person or her family had to live without food, heating, electricity or 
clothes.
23 Consistent with a priori expectations and previous literature, both variables have negative signs 
in both tables. This suggests that the more intense the economic hardship experienced by an individual, 
the lower is her support for the transition process. Note also that the young cohort dummy becomes 
insignificant.  
Regarding the speed of reforms, respondents were asked in 1995 and 1996 whether they thought that 
the reform process was going “too fast”, “too slow” or “at the right speed”. The results in column (3) of 
Tables 8 and 9 indicate that the perceptions of a “wrong” speed of reforms (“too high” or “too slow”) 
negatively influence individual attitudes towards transition. Interestingly, conducting reforms too fast 
                                                 
23 This variable was already available in the dataset.  
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may be associated with a stronger individual resistance, as suggested by the larger coefficient on the 
“too fast” dummy. In this case the young cohort dummy also becomes insignificant. 
Individual preferences about the political system may be another potentially omitted variable, especially 
in the equation for political reforms. We attempt to proxy for a preference towards dictatorship, using the 
following two variables. Survey respondents were asked whether they would approve if the Parliament 
was suspended and whether it would be better “to get rid of Parliament and elections and have a strong 
leader”.  The results in columns (4) and (5) indicate that such preferences are indeed significantly and 
negatively correlated to support for transition, both in the economic and in the political dimensions. 
We then attempt to control for the extent of corruption in a country by generating a variable that equals 
1 if an individual thinks that most or almost all “public officials are engaged in bribe-taking and 
corruption” in his country, and equals zero if he thinks that “very few” or “less than half public officials 
are corrupt”. Unfortunately, this question was asked only in 2001 and 2004 and the sample size drops 
substantially. Nevertheless, as indicated in column (6), the coefficients on the other individual 
characteristics remain fairly robust, while the corruption variable is significant and has the expected 
negative sign for both economic and political attitudes. 
The opinion that the state should engage more actively in redistributing resources across individuals may 
originate either as a cultural preference or as a reaction to current unfavorable economic circumstances. 
In any case, preferences towards redistribution may be correlated with individual attitudes towards 
transition from communism. This is indeed the case, as is shown in column (7). Those who agree with the 
statement that “incomes should be made more equal so there is no big difference in income” (as opposed 
to the statement “Individual achievement should determine how much people are paid”) have less 
support for transition. 
In this empirical literature, age is often used as a proxy for ideology. However, age could reflect either 
the increased hardship imposed by transition on older individuals with obsolete skills, or, indeed, the fact 
that their ideological values might have been shaped by communist institutions and culture. In fact, as 
we have shown, older individuals are particularly negative about the transition process and are 
significantly more likely to belong to the “nostalgic” and “reactionary” groups. In addition, in column (8), 
we include a variable which indicates whether the respondent or any of his family members was formerly 
a member of the Communist Party. As expected, this variable is significant and has a negative sign in 
both tables, suggesting that past party membership is negatively correlated with individual support for 
transition. At the same time, the significance of the age dummies is reduced and the young cohort 
dummy becomes insignificant, which suggests that, indeed, age is also – but not only – a proxy for 
ideology.
  
Finally, we have introduced several variables that measure the diffusion of trust towards political 
institutions and people (columns 9-12). Our findings suggest that trust towards parties, parliament, the 
president or other people is associated with a more positive assessment of the transition process 
(although trusting people is only marginally significant in the model for economic support).  
Overall, throughout this exercise, the sign and significance of other individual characteristics remain fairly 
robust to the introduction of additional variables and to the related changes in the composition and size 
of the sample. Although this exercise is purely descriptive, it sheds additional light on the issue of who is 
against transitional reforms. It is also in line with the “lifetime learning model” of regime support (Mishler  
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and Rose, 2002), which implies that citizens learn about a new regime on the basis of individual 
experiences, characteristics and preferences.  
 
c.  Country-specific analysis 
In this section, we take a closer look at cross-country differences. As shown in the previous sections, 
significant country dummies suggest that there are differences across countries in support for transition. 
In addition, since the composition of the countries’ sample changes throughout the period, one would 
need to undertake a country-specific analysis in order to identify trends in support attitudes. This section 
provides such an analysis and examines the determinants of individual evaluations of the economic and 
the political systems in fourteen transition countries on a country-by-country basis (Tables 10 and 11, 
respectively).  
The individual characteristics included in the regressions are the same as in the baseline model in Tables 
3 and 4. The only exception is the introduction of a minority dummy for the Baltic States. Ethnic 
minorities constitute a significant part of the population in these countries (especially in Estonia and 
Latvia) and the process of transition may have affected them differently from the majority of 
population.
24  
[Insert Table 10 and Table 11] 
An analysis of the attitudes towards transition on a country-by-country basis reveals that there is indeed 
some heterogeneity across countries. Regarding the economic transition (Table 10), age has a negative 
correlation with the dependent variable in all countries, except for Slovenia, Romania and Croatia. In 
addition, belonging to the young cohort has a positive effect in Bulgaria and a larger one in Russia. Being  
female has a significant negative effect in seven countries, with the strongest negative effect in the three 
Baltic States. University education is strongly associated with support for transition in all countries, 
except for Romania, Croatia and Belarus. Urbanization has, in general, a positive and significant effect in 
most countries, with the exception of Slovenia, Romania, Croatia, Ukraine and Belarus. Being in the 
highest household income quartiles always has a positive and significant correlation with support 
attitudes, apart for Croatia. Belonging to an ethnic minority has a significant negative effect in all three 
Baltic countries, with the largest effect being in Estonia, probably reflecting the hardship of adjusting to 
the new system for individuals of Russian origin and their dissatisfaction with their economic situation 
and political rights. It is remarkable that individual unemployment does not appear to be significant in 
Russia and Belarus. This could presumably be related to the fact that wage arrears rather than layoffs 
have been prevailing in Russia as a means to reduce the burden of labor costs on firms, and that very 
few reforms have taken place in Belarus at all. Regarding the evolution of support over time, there is an 
increasing trend in a slight majority of countries as support was in general lower in the 1990s than in 
2004.
25  
As regards support attitudes towards the political transition (see Table 11), age has a negative effect in 
all countries, at least for some age groups, except for Latvia and Croatia, and the effect is only marginally 
                                                 
24  For an analysis of labor market performance of immigrants and non-citizens in the new EU member states see 
Kahanec and Zaiceva (2009). 
25 Note that for Croatia we have information only for 1992 and 1993, with the latter being the reference year.  
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significant (at the 10 percent level) for some groups in Hungary and Lithuania. Belonging to the young 
cohort has a positive and significant correlation with the support attitudes only in Estonia, Lithuania and 
Croatia. Being female has a significantly negative effect again in about half of the countries, including 
Poland, Slovenia, the Baltic States and Bulgaria. University education has a positive association 
everywhere, except for Croatia and Belarus. Living in a city generally has a positive and significant effect, 
except for Croatia, Romania and Belarus, while it is negative in the Ukraine. Belonging to the highest 
household income quartile always has a positive and significant impact (with the exception of Croatia 
where it is insignificant). The minority dummy for the Baltic countries is again negative and significant 
with the largest effect being in Estonia. Regarding the unemployment status, our results suggest that it is 
much less important for the evaluation of the political system than of the economic system, since this 
variable is significant only for Latvia, Bulgaria and Croatia (and marginally significant for Hungary and 
Lithuania). Finally, regarding year dummies, while the support for economic transition is generally 
increasing in roughly half of the countries, there is less evidence of an increasing trend in the support for 
the political transition, as the coefficients on the year dummies are positive or insignificant in many 
cases. If anything, countries where support for change in the political system was lower in the 1990s 
than in 2004 include the CIS, Lithuania and, to some extent, Hungary. 
Overall, the country-specific analysis shows that, although there is some heterogeneity across countries, 
differences are in many cases related to the size and significance of the estimated coefficients. Moreover, 
individual characteristics, such as age, university education, urbanization, employment status and 
relative income, almost always have, with a few exceptions, a significant effect on individual assessments 
of both the economic and the political systems. The support attitudes seem to increase mostly for the 
economic transition, while there is less evidence of an increasing trend for the political support. Although 
support seems to have risen in the CIS countries by 2004, they have on average the lowest support 
attitudes as suggested by the coefficients on country-specific dummies in the previous sections. Thus, in 
what follows, we return to the pooled analysis and will search for potential explanations for the lower 
level of support that apparently characterizes the CIS countries. 
 
6.  Why is support for transition lower in the CIS countries? 
A common finding from the previous sections is that the average level of support for transition, in both 
the economic and political dimensions, differs across countries, with the lowest support being in the CIS 
countries. In fact, given the diversity of the initial conditions, of the objectives and sequences of the 
reforms that have been adopted, of the forms and degrees of political developments and of the economic 
performance achieved, it would be surprising if citizens from different countries would converge to the 
same evaluations of their countries’ experiences.  
Both CIS and CEE countries have the experience of a socialist economy with relatively secure jobs, 
officially low inequality and equal pay, but also low motivation and low individual responsibility. There 
were, however, several important differences between these countries, including differences in their 
history and overall democratic achievements. Even in 2004, the Freedom House Ranking of political rights 
and civil liberties ranged between “not free” in Belarus and “partly free” in Russia and Ukraine to “free” in 
the CEE countries. CIS countries have arguably gone through a longer and more intense experience of 
communism and of the socialist economy relative to most CEE countries. Communism was the national 
form of government in Russia, Belarus and Ukraine, and the period under communism lasted seven  
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decades in the CIS, five decades in the Baltic States and four decades in the CEE countries. In addition, 
many central and eastern European countries had historical and geographic ties to western Europe, 
including trade relations (Svejnar, 2002). Also, the economic reforms were implemented using different 
strategies and policies, and as a result the performance of the CIS and CEE countries differed. As 
mentioned in the introduction, the potential explanations for these differences in performance suggested 
in the literature include larger safety nets and non-employment benefits in the CEE countries, better legal 
systems and enforcement of laws and regulations, a lower degree of corruption and rent seeking than in 
the CIS. On the basis of this literature, this section explores several potential explanations for the 
differences in support attitudes between CIS and CEE countries. 
Which factors may account for these differences? Do individual transition-related experiences and 
preferences contribute to explain them, or do differences across countries in economic performance and 
institutions matter? In this section, we present our explorations of these questions and suggest a (non-
exhaustive) list of several potential explanations. The role of individual experiences and preferences is 
examined in section 6a, and that of country-specific factors in section 6b.   
 
a.  Individual experiences, values and preferences 
In order to examine to what extent the lower support in the CIS countries may be attributable to 
individual experiences, values and preferences, we add to our baseline model (see Tables 3 and 4, 
column (3)) additional interaction terms with country dummies and individual variables. If these variables 
contribute to explain the lower levels of support in the CIS countries, we should observe a significant 
coefficient on these additional interactions and at the same time the coefficients on the Russia, Ukraine 
and Belarus dummies should either decrease in magnitude or become insignificant. On the basis of the 
literature mentioned above, the candidates for potential explanations in our dataset include preferences 
for redistribution and income equality, for state responsibility over individuals’ material security and for 
state ownership, as well as for a secure (but also less rewarding) job. In addition, we have experimented 
with the variables already used in Tables 8 and 9, such as transition-related hardship, opinions on the 
speed of reforms and on corruption, preferences for a strong leader and trust in political institutions.  
[Insert Table 12] 
Table 12 shows the estimation results for both economic (upper panel) and political (lower panel) support 
attitudes.
26 Since the results are qualitatively the same in both panels, we will discuss them jointly in 
what follows. This table indicates that trusting political institutions (parties and parliament, but not the 
president) and having preferences for state responsibility and ownership contribute to a greater or 
smaller extent to explaining the lower support attitudes in the CIS, as the coefficients on the dummies for 
Russia, Ukraine and Belarus diminish in absolute value, while the additional interaction terms are 
significant. Remarkably, another variable that contributes greatly to explain these differences is individual 
preference for a secure job and low pay (as opposed to high-pay job and high risks), suggesting that 
employment-related reasons are indeed important. On the other hand, contrary to what was expected, 
                                                 
26 The rest of the individual characteristics is the same as in the baseline model in Tables 3 and 4. In Table 12, results 
in each odd-numbered column should be compared with those in the adjacent even-numbered column with the 
same sample size.   
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preferences for equal income do not explain the lower support attitudes in the CIS countries (if anything, 
only marginally in Russia).  
Regarding other variables (not reported, but available upon request), there is no conclusive evidence that 
transition-related hardship matters for explaining the differences between the CIS and other countries. 
While the variable based on the destitution scale explains some part of this difference, as suggested by 
the decreased coefficients on the CIS country dummies, the number of weeks without pay or job does not 
contribute to explaining these differences. These results, however, may be interesting per se, suggesting 
that it is the number of weeks without food and heating that matters, rather than the number of weeks 
without pay or job. Indeed, this seems plausible if we take into account the peculiarities of transition 
processes in these two regions, in particular, labor hoarding and high wage arrears in Russia. There is 
also evidence that the speed of the reforms matters to some extent, with the “too fast” variable 
explaining a small part of the differences in Russia and “too slow” in Belarus (where indeed very few if 
any reforms took place) and Ukraine (where dissatisfaction with the corrupted government and sluggish 
transformation has resulted in the Orange Revolution in late 2004). Having preferences for a dictatorship 
and approving a strong leader seems to reduce to some extent the magnitude of the coefficients for 
Russia and Ukraine, but not for Belarus (where the interaction is insignificant). In contrast, individual 
perceptions of corruption do not explain the lower support in the CIS countries (although the sample size 
becomes small).  
Overall, trust in political institutions, preferences for a greater role of the state in the economy, and, 
especially, preferences for secure (and less remunerated) jobs matter in explaining part of the differences 
between the CIS and other countries. However, although the coefficients on the CIS dummies are 
diminished in size, they have not become insignificant after the inclusion of these additional interaction 
terms. This suggests that there are other important factors that should be explored further.  
         
b.  Country-specific performance and institutions 
To complete the picture, we now focus on macro-economic and institutional indicators of the overall 
quality of the economic and political systems. The role of institutions and policies in affecting individual 
attitudes in post-communist countries has been documented in the literature (see, among others, 
Denisova et al., 2007; Guriev and Zhuravskaya, 2009). For example, output growth and lower income 
inequality as well as less corruption or better governance could signal better opportunities for most 
individuals and could thus be associated with more support for transition. On the other hand, as argued 
in Rodrik (1995) and Fidrmuc (1999), especially at the beginning of transition, high unemployment may 
actually signal the need for more radical reforms and thus paradoxically reinforce support for reforms. 
Therefore, the sign on the unemployment variable is a priori ambiguous. 
Again, we focus on how the introduction of these new variables into the baseline model affects the 
coefficients of the country dummies. Results are reported in Tables 13 and 14 for the economic and 
political systems, respectively.  
[Insert Table 13 and Table 14] 
In order to facilitate comparisons, column (1) reproduces the results from Tables 3 and 4 (column 3). 
Individual controls are included in all regressions, but are not reported to save space. Column (2)  
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introduces three traditional macro-economic control variables, aggregate unemployment, GDP per capita 
and inflation, as well as a political indicator for the extent of democracy in a country, the Democracy 
Index from the Polity IV database. As can be seen from this column, none of the macro-economic 
variables is statistically significant (note, however, that they are included in addition to country and year-
specific effects).
27 This may be due to several reasons. First, individuals may care more about their own 
economic performance (i.e. unemployment) than about unemployment in their country in general.
28 A 
second reason may be that left-wing and right-wing individuals might place different weights on 
unemployment vs. inflation.
29 As argued by Di Tella and MacCulloch (2005), consistent with “partisan” 
models of political economy, left-wing individuals care more about unemployment relative to inflation 
than right-wingers. When averaging across left and right-wing individuals (as is done here), these 
differences may cancel out. Third, high unemployment might actually signal the need for more reforms 
(as in Rodrik, 1995). Finally, an indicator for the overall progress in transition could constitute an omitted 
variable. Hence, in column (3) we control for the lagged EBRD index of transition reforms. The 
introduction of these regressors definitely raises issues of collinearity and endogeneity, hence caution is 
needed when interpreting these results. In any case, the reforms index is either only marginally 
significant or insignificant and, if anything, a higher unemployment rate is negatively correlated with 
support for economic transition, but is unrelated with support for political transition. 
Somewhat surprisingly, the higher level of democracy is negatively related to support for transition (in 
both Tables). To interpret this result, note that, for the majority of countries, this indicator does not vary 
much during this period, with the exception of Romania (where it is increasing) and Belarus (where it is 
decreasing). Thus, this variable acts almost as a dummy, reflecting at most the difference between EU 
and non-EU members, and does not convey much additional information into the regressions. It is also in 
line with the results in Guriev and Zhuravskaya (2009), who find a negative relation between democracy 
and the happiness index, and also with Denisova et al. (2007), who show that, in more democratic 
countries, individuals who experience economic hardship during transition are more likely to favor re-
nationalization.  
An increase in income inequality may be another reason why people have negative attitudes towards the 
economic or the political system. In line with Guriev and Zhuravskaya (2009), we find that the Gini index 
has a significant negative effect in both Tables 13 and 14. While its inclusion does not, in general, 
diminish the significance of the CIS dummies in Table 13, it does so in Table 14, suggesting that 
increased inequality might be an important explanation of the differences in individual support for the 
political system.
30  
                                                 
27 Macro-economic variables are also insignificant if an indicator for democracy is not added to the regressions. Note 
also that these country-specific variables may be collinear with country and year fixed effects 
28 This is consistent with the so-called “individualist” hypothesis from the political economy literature discussed in 
section 2. 
29 In addition, there might be a relevant discontinuity in the individual reactions to inflation, as many countries in our 
sample where characterized by hyperinflation in the early 1990s. 
30 To proxy for the deterioration of public goods we have experimented with several indicators, such as hospital beds, 
life expectancy, number of doctors, public expenditures on health and education, mortality rates of children, 
immunization rate and enrollment rates in primary, secondary and tertiary education. For instance, life expectancy, 
in particular of males, declined significantly in the CIS countries (Svejnar, 2002). However, the inclusion of these 
variables, in general, did not contribute to the disappearance of significant effects on the CIS country dummies, 
while the number of hospital beds and doctors reduced somewhat the magnitude of some country-specific effects 
(available upon request).  
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Finally, to analyze whether the quality of political institutions matter, we include World Bank Governance 
Indicators (an average of all indicators in column 6 and all of them separately in column 7). The results 
should now be compared with column (5), where the baseline regressions are run for the same sub-
sample with non-missing information on governance. The coefficient of the single governance index is 
positive (although insignificant). Notably, the inclusion of this indicator (either as a simple average of all 
indicators or in disaggregated form) eliminates the significance of all the negative CIS country dummies, 
in particular in the equation for the economic transition.
31 This may suggest that the quality of political 
institutions matters in explaining the negative attitudes towards the functioning of a country’s economic 
system. In addition, when included separately (column 7), the Governance Indicators have 
heterogeneous effects on economic and political attitudes. While political stability, regulatory quality and 
the rule of law are associated with higher support for the economic transition, it is political stability and 
the rule of law that matter for the evaluation of change in the political system, with the latter variable 
having the largest positive effect.   
 
7.   Conclusions 
As the recent EBRD Life in Transition survey remarks, “17 years of transition have taken a toll” (EBRD, 
2007b). Indeed, there is a certain “transition fatigue” in the region, a discontent with transition that could 
be also responsible for the more frequent changes of government in several countries in the recent years. 
In this paper we document the extent of this discontent in 14 transition countries during 1991-2004 and 
analyze its determinants.  
We find that the overall support for change in both the economic and political systems is relatively low 
and heterogeneous across different interest groups and countries, although public support for political 
t r a n s i t i o n  i s  h i g h e r  t h a n  f o r  t h e  e c o n o m i c  t r a n s i t i o n .  T h e  l o w e r  s u p p o r t  i s  f o u n d ,  i n  l i n e  w i t h  t h e  
literature, among the older, less educated, unemployed and poor individuals and among females, that is 
those who were more likely to “lose” from transition in relative terms. Support for transition is lowest in 
the CIS countries. On the other hand, there is also an increasing trend in support for the economic 
transition in many countries. These main findings remain robust to changes in the specification and in the 
definition of the dependent variable. Interestingly, it appears that the same factors that are related to an 
“aversion to transition” (lower support) are also positively related to a willingness to return to 
communism. However, only one-third of individuals who evaluate the past socialist economy or 
communist system positively, would actually agree to do so. 
W e  a l s o  f i n d  e v i d e n c e  t h a t  t r a n s i tion-related hardship, opinions on the speed of reforms, political 
preferences and preferences towards redistribution, ideology and social capital matter. Economic 
difficulties experienced during the transition, individual preferences towards dictatorship or redistribution 
of incomes, opinions on corruption, ex-Communist Party membership and less trust for politicians or 
other people are associated with lower support for the transition process. Interestingly, individuals who 
think that the reforms were conducted too fast are most likely to oppose the transition.  
                                                 
31 Note that in the equation for the political system (Table 14), the coefficients on CIS country dummies become 
insignificant already in the sub-sample with non-missing observations for the governance indicators (column (5)).    
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Finally, exploring the potential explanations for the lower support attitudes in the CIS countries, we find 
evidence for the importance of trust in political institutions, preferences for a greater role of the state in 
the economy, and, especially, preferences for secure (and less remunerated) jobs. There is also evidence 
that macro-economic and political institutions matter. Unequal provision and the deterioration of public 
goods seem to matter to some extent for explaining the lower support for the economic transition. On the 
other hand, increased inequality is an important factor in explaining the lower support for the political 
transition. More importantly, the quality of political institutions, as measured by the Governance 
Indicators, contributes greatly to explaining the lower support for the economic transition in the CIS. In 
particular, while political stability, regulatory quality and the rule of law mostly affect the support for the 
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Source: Authors’ tabulations from the New Barometers data. Sample includes all individuals. 
 
Figure 2: Dynamics of Support, 1991-2004 
 
   
Source: Authors’ tabulations from the New Barometers data. See text and Appendix for definition of distance. 
Notes: 1996 and 2000 are excluded, since only Russia and the Baltic States are available for these years. Sample 





































































Figure 3: Support for change in the economic and political systems, by country 
 
a) Economic “distance”  
 
b) Political “distance” 
 
Source: Authors’ tabulations from the New Barometers data. Notes: See text and Appendix for definition of distance. 
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Source: Authors’ tabulations from the New Barometers data. Sample includes all individuals.  
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Table 1a: Groups formed on the basis of the evaluation of the economic or political system 
 




    
Positive Positive  Positive Compliant 
    
Negative Negative     
Negative Neutral     
Neutral Negative     
Neutral Neutral  Negative Skeptic 
    
Positive Neutral     
Positive Negative  Nostalgic Reactionary 
    
Neutral Positive     
Negative Positive  Pro-market Democrat 
Notes: “positive” refers to evaluation greater than zero, 
“negative” – smaller than zero, “neutral” – equal to zero. 
 
Table 1b: Classification of countries into groups according to the evaluation of the economic and political 
systems 
 
   Economic System  Political System 
Czech R.  1991 Pro-mkt  Democrat 
  2004 Pro-mkt  Democrat 
Slovakia  1991 Nostalgic  Democrat 
  2004 Nostalgic  Reactionary 
Hungary  1991 Nostalgic  Compliant 
  2004 Nostalgic  Compliant 
Poland  1991 Negative  Skeptic 
  2004 Nostalgic  Skeptic/Comp 
Slovenia  1991 Negative  Democrat 
  2004 Positive  Compliant 
Estonia  1993 Nostalgic  Compliant 
  2004 Positive  Compliant 
Latvia  1993 Nostalgic  Reactionary 
  2004 Nostalgic  Reactionary 
Lithuania  1993 Nostalgic  Reactionary 
  2004 Positive  Compliant 
Bulgaria  1991 Nostalgic  Democrat 
  2004 Nostalgic  Reactionary 
Romania  1991 Negative  Democrat 
  2004 Nostalgic  Democrat 
Croatia  1992 Negative  Skeptic 
  1998 Nostalgic  Skeptic 
Russia  1992 Nostalgic  Reactionary 
  2004 Nostalgic  Compliant 
Ukraine  1992 Nostalgic  Reactionary 
  2004 Positive  Compliant 
Belarus  1991 Nostalgic  Reactionary 
  2004 Positive  Compliant 




Table 2: Group linkages for the evaluations of the economic and political systems 
 
Economic system  Political system 





















































































































































Col. 1-3: Evaluation of the economic system, for citizens which have expressed different evaluations of 
the political system (percent of total evaluations, all countries). 
Col. 4-6: Evaluation of the political system, for citizens which have expressed different evaluations of 




Table 3: Determinants of support for the economic system: Present versus past 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 







Female 0.092***  -0.098*  -0.127**  -0.132**  -0.152**  0.012 
  (0.030) (0.046) (0.048) (0.048)  (0.055)  (0.013) 
Young_cohort    -0.048***  0.111*** 0.093*** 0.082***  0.138***  -0.020 
  (0.013) (0.025) (0.019) (0.023)  (0.042)  (0.029) 
Age  30-39  0.025*  -0.043** -0.047** -0.044**  -0.057**  0.003 
  (0.014) (0.019) (0.016) (0.017)  (0.023)  (0.020) 
Age  40-49  0.123***  -0.090*** -0.145*** -0.152***  -0.177***  0.014 
  (0.018) (0.027) (0.024) (0.024)  (0.043)  (0.029) 
Age  50-59  0.154***  -0.097*** -0.170*** -0.169***  -0.199***  0.019 
  (0.022) (0.025) (0.026) (0.026)  (0.037)  (0.026) 
Age>60 0.102**  -0.052  -0.108*  -0.113**  -0.132**  0.024 
  (0.035) (0.047) (0.050) (0.048)  (0.059)  (0.048) 
Secondary /  -0.105***  0.033  0.094***  0.070**  0.096**  0.016 
vocational  (0.025) (0.025) (0.027) (0.027)  (0.034)  (0.023) 
University    -0.338***  0.108*** 0.298*** 0.266***  0.347***  0.019 
  (0.021) (0.028) (0.025) (0.028)  (0.040)  (0.036) 
Single   -0.088***  0.010  0.067***  0.075***  0.092***  0.003 
  (0.019) (0.015) (0.022) (0.019)  (0.026)  (0.022) 
Divorced /  -0.013  -0.002  0.010  0.017  0.023  0.006 
widowed  (0.015) (0.013) (0.016) (0.014)  (0.015)  (0.024) 
City   -0.140**  0.015  0.103**  0.113**  0.130**  0.083*** 
  (0.048) (0.028) (0.045) (0.043)  (0.059)  (0.015) 
Big town  -0.022  -0.025  -0.002  0.011  0.012  0.033 
  (0.026) (0.017) (0.024) (0.022)  (0.028)  (0.019) 
Unemployed    0.138***  -0.119*** -0.167*** -0.158***  -0.205***  -0.022 
  (0.032) (0.028) (0.036) (0.032)  (0.041)  (0.021) 
Pensioner   0.094***  -0.009  -0.067**  -0.063*  -0.075  0.078** 
  (0.019) (0.033) (0.031) (0.029)  (0.047)  (0.034) 
Student /  -0.064***  0.035**  0.069***  0.077***  0.078**  -0.004 
housewife  (0.019) (0.012) (0.016) (0.017)  (0.032)  (0.023) 
2
nd hh. income  -0.020  -0.005  0.012  0.020  0.028  0.002 
quartile  (0.015) (0.026) (0.025) (0.021)  (0.025)  (0.016) 
3
rd hh. income  -0.070***  0.038  0.077**  0.090**  0.123***  0.021 
quartile  (0.016) (0.041) (0.034) (0.032)  (0.034)  (0.023) 
4
th  hh.  income  -0.238***  0.181*** 0.281*** 0.302***  0.417***  0.077*** 
quartile  (0.026) (0.035) (0.035) (0.030)  (0.031)  (0.017) 
Czech Republic  -0.328***  0.455***  0.520***       
  (0.037) (0.043) (0.014)       
Slovakia   0.209***  -0.191***  -0.255***       
  (0.011) (0.022) (0.012)       
Hungary   0.375***  -0.173***  -0.385***       
  (0.027) (0.034) (0.014)       
Poland   -0.122***  0.014  0.119***       
  (0.031) (0.035) (0.012)       
Estonia   0.248***  0.234***  -0.036       
  (0.030) (0.040) (0.035)       
Lithiania   0.600***  -0.444***  -0.679***       
  (0.031) (0.037) (0.034)       
Latvia   0.413***  -0.429***  -0.532***       
  (0.031) (0.038) (0.035)       
Bulgaria   0.173***  -0.477***  -0.367***       
  (0.011) (0.013) (0.009)       
Romania   -0.066**  -0.245***  -0.101***       
  (0.028) (0.039) (0.031)       
Croatia   -0.357***  -0.107  0.218***       
  (0.071) (0.074) (0.036)       
Russia   0.562***  -0.538***  -0.689***       
  (0.032) (0.034) (0.027)       
Ukraine   0.765***  -0.844***  -1.054***       
  (0.021) (0.027) (0.018)       
Belarus   0.668***  -0.406***  -0.753***       
  (0.019) (0.033) (0.022)       
1991 -0.406***  -0.680***  -0.164       
  (0.093) (0.165) (0.134)       
1992 -0.272**  -0.860***  -0.368***       
  (0.119) (0.198) (0.114)       
1993 -0.158**  -0.609***  -0.289**        
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  (0.071) (0.147) (0.124)       
1995 -0.049  -0.591***  -0.344**     
  (0.093) (0.168) (0.152)       
1996 -0.167  -0.524***  -0.216     
  (0.123) (0.131) (0.144)       
1998 -0.156  -0.577***  -0.248     
  (0.117) (0.158) (0.147)       
2000 0.101  -0.446**  -0.312**       
  (0.099) (0.150) (0.128)       
2001 -0.156**  -0.102  0.043       
  (0.071) (0.146) (0.104)       
Constant 0.470***  0.433**  -0.058  -0.353***  -0.574***  0.902*** 
  (0.089) (0.148) (0.143) (0.072)  (0.092)  (0.036) 
Country*year 
dummies 
No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  72648 73636 72012 72012  41050  9779 
R-squared  0.16 0.15 0.19 0.22  0.29  0.05 
Notes:   Estimation method: OLS. Standard errors clustered by country are reported in parentheses. * significant at 10 
percent; ** significant at 5 percent; *** significant at 1 percent. Dependent variables in columns (1) and (2) are 
standardized individuals’ rankings of past or present economic systems, respectively. Dependent variable in columns 
(3)-(6) is the standardized distance between the rankings of present and past economic systems. Reference individual 
is male, age 20-29, cohort between 18 and 55 years old in 1990, less than secondary school education, married, living 
in rural or small town, employed, with household income in the 1st quartile. Reference country and year: Slovenia, 
2004. In columns (4)-(6) the additional reference category is Slovenia*2004. For definitions of variables, see text and 

































Table 4. Determinants of support for the political system: Present versus past 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 






Female 0.073***  -0.066**  -0.093**  -0.092**  -0.151***  0.003 
 (0.024)  (0.029)  (0.033)  (0.033)  (0.050)  (0.009) 
Young_cohort -0.034** 0.095*** 0.079*** 0.068***  0.120***  -0.023 
 (0.015)  (0.023)  (0.017)  (0.018)  (0.031)  (0.028) 
Age 30-39  0.035***  -0.018  -0.038**  -0.035**  -0.066**  0.012 
 (0.010)  (0.018)  (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.023)  (0.015) 
Age 40-49  0.135***  -0.036  -0.120***  -0.129***  -0.196***  -0.001 
 (0.011)  (0.025)  (0.017)  (0.018)  (0.027)  (0.023) 
Age 50-59  0.159***  -0.049  -0.145***  -0.144***  -0.206***  0.029 
 (0.024)  (0.029)  (0.029)  (0.029)  (0.031)  (0.025) 
Age>60 0.114**  -0.051  -0.116**  -0.113**  -0.161**  0.051 
 (0.046)  (0.044)  (0.054)  (0.051)  (0.063)  (0.033) 
Secondary /  -0.138***  0.075***  0.137***  0.122***  0.179***  0.049*** 
vocational (0.025)  (0.021)  (0.025)  (0.023)  (0.036)  (0.015) 
University   -0.354***  0.155***  0.342***  0.321***  0.471***  0.084*** 
 (0.020)  (0.039)  (0.027)  (0.023)  (0.045)  (0.022) 
Single   -0.068***  -0.002  0.047**  0.049***  0.043  -0.003 
 (0.018)  (0.014)  (0.018)  (0.016)  (0.028)  (0.023) 
Divorced /  -0.013  -0.012  0.003  0.001  -0.017  -0.011 
widowed (0.013)  (0.020)  (0.020)  (0.018)  (0.022)  (0.013) 
City   -0.126**  0.004  0.091*  0.100*  0.141*  0.087*** 
 (0.051)  (0.032)  (0.050)  (0.046)  (0.067)  (0.018) 
Big town  -0.017  -0.048*  -0.016  0.004  0.006  0.046** 
 (0.034)  (0.023)  (0.032)  (0.031)  (0.047)  (0.017) 
Unemployed   0.098***  -0.091***  -0.126***  -0.115***  -0.180***  0.033*** 
 (0.025)  (0.023)  (0.029)  (0.028)  (0.038)  (0.011) 
Pensioner   0.078***  0.042  -0.026  -0.029  -0.025  0.048** 
 (0.017)  (0.031)  (0.026)  (0.023)  (0.040)  (0.017) 
Student  / -0.050**  0.050**  0.063***  0.070***  0.087** 0.021 
housewife (0.023)  (0.017)  (0.020)  (0.020)  (0.030)  (0.018) 
2
nd hh. income  -0.037**  0.019  0.040*  0.051***  0.077***  0.010 
quartile (0.017)  (0.021)  (0.022)  (0.016)  (0.024)  (0.017) 
3
rd hh. income  -0.107***  0.073**  0.120***  0.130***  0.181***  0.024 
quartile (0.019)  (0.027)  (0.025)  (0.023)  (0.035)  (0.015) 
4
th hh. income  -0.234***  0.153***  0.260***  0.275***  0.409***  0.063*** 
quartile (0.030)  (0.026)  (0.031)  (0.025)  (0.045)  (0.016) 
Czech Republic  -0.533***  0.429***  0.568***       
 (0.025)  (0.047)  (0.025)       
Slovakia   0.001  -0.101***  -0.081***       
 (0.010)  (0.022)  (0.015)       
Hungary   0.284***  -0.141***  -0.309***       
 (0.024)  (0.030)  (0.016)       
Poland   -0.224***  0.034  0.159***       
 (0.027)  (0.032)  (0.017)       
Estonia   0.064**  0.027  -0.063*       
 (0.024)  (0.035)  (0.032)       
Lithuania   0.106***  -0.337***  -0.301***       
 (0.025)  (0.036)  (0.032)       
Latvia   0.093***  -0.398***  -0.323***       
 (0.024)  (0.035)  (0.033)       
Bulgaria   0.035**  -0.013  -0.067***       
 (0.013)  (0.018)  (0.014)       
Romania   -0.328***  0.160***  0.340***       
 (0.027)  (0.031)  (0.026)       
Croatia   -0.564***  -0.208**  0.265***       
 (0.055)  (0.090)  (0.036)       
Russia   0.435***  -0.577***  -0.676***       
 (0.020)  (0.031)  (0.021)       
Ukraine   0.431***  -0.488***  -0.625***       
 (0.017)  (0.028)  (0.024)       
Belarus   0.420***  -0.348***  -0.533***       
 (0.016)  (0.028)  (0.026)       
1991 -0.447***  -0.165  0.218       
 (0.088)  (0.164)  (0.142)       
1992 -0.295***  -0.421*  -0.045       
 (0.091)  (0.224)  (0.108)       
1993 -0.231***  -0.190  0.045        
 
39
 (0.065)  (0.141)  (0.108)       
1995 -0.192**  -0.184  0.026       
 (0.076)  (0.160)  (0.134)       
1996 -0.287***  -0.290**  0.037       
 (0.059)  (0.116)  (0.095)       
1998 -0.132  -0.306*  -0.086       
 (0.099)  (0.161)  (0.155)       
2000 0.012  -0.147  -0.084      
 (0.059)  (0.122)  (0.086)       
2001 0.022  0.012  -0.000      
 (0.074)  (0.120)  (0.090)       
Constant 0.322***  0.364**  0.016  -0.171***  -0.186**  1.034*** 
 (0.076)  (0.137)  (0.123)  (0.053)  (0.084)  (0.036) 
Country*year 
dummies 
No No  No Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 71337  72262  70532  70532  38358  18684 
R-squared 0.15  0.10  0.17  0.19 0.29  0.07 
Notes:   Estimation method: OLS. Standard errors clustered by country are reported in parentheses. * significant at 10 
percent; ** significant at 5 percent; *** significant at 1 percent. Dependent variables in columns (1) and (2) are 
standardized individuals’ rankings of past or present political systems, respectively. Dependent variable in columns 
(3)-(6) is the standardized distance between the rankings of present and past economic systems. Reference individual 
is male, age 20-29, cohort between 18 and 55 years old in 1990, less than secondary school education, married, living 
in rural or small town, employed, with household income in the 1st quartile. Reference country and year: Slovenia, 

































Table 5. Determinants of support - present versus past, SUR model 
 
 (1)  (2) 




Female -0.125***  -0.092*** 
 (0.008)  (0.008) 
Young_cohort 0.088***  0.065*** 
 (0.017)  (0.017) 
Age 30-39  -0.042***  -0.037** 
 (0.015)  (0.015) 
Age 40-49  -0.151***  -0.131*** 
 (0.015)  (0.015) 
Age 50-59  -0.167***  -0.145*** 
 (0.016)  (0.016) 
Age>60 -0.115***  -0.117*** 
 (0.018)  (0.018) 
Secondary / vocational  0.072***  0.121*** 
 (0.010)  (0.010) 
University   0.268***  0.321*** 
 (0.013)  (0.013) 
Single   0.073***  0.048*** 
 (0.012)  (0.012) 
Divorced / widowed  0.022**  0.001 
 (0.011)  (0.011) 
City   0.120***  0.101*** 
 (0.010)  (0.010) 
Big town  0.012  0.005 
 (0.009)  (0.009) 
Unemployed   -0.160***  -0.114*** 
 (0.014)  (0.014) 
Pensioner   -0.063***  -0.029** 
 (0.013)  (0.013) 
Student / housewife  0.077***  0.070*** 
 (0.015)  (0.015) 
2
nd hh. income quartile  0.023**  0.054*** 
 (0.011)  (0.011) 
3rd hh. income quartile  0.095***  0.136*** 
 (0.011)  (0.011) 
4th hh. income quartile  0.301***  0.279*** 
 (0.012)  (0.012) 
Constant -0.359***  -0.179*** 
 (0.041)  (0.041) 
Correlation  0.5523 
Breusch-Pagan test of independence  chi2(1) = 21001.496 
Pr = 0.0000 
Observations 68860 
 
Notes:   Estimation method: SUR. Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10 percent; ** 
significant at 5 percent; *** significant at 1 percent. Dependent variables are the standardized 
distances between rankings of present and past economic and political systems. Reference categories 
as in Tables 3 and 4 column (4). Additional regressors include interactions between country and year 






















Table 6. Determinants of adhesion to a group 
 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
 
Economic system  Political system 
 
Positive Pro-market  Nostalgic Compliant  Democrat  Reactionary 
Female  -0.016      
(0.012) 
-0.022***     
(0.008) 




















Age 30-39  -0.004     
(0.006) 
-0.012**      
(0.006) 








Age 40-49  -0.013      
(0.009) 
-0.030***     
(0.006) 








Age 50-59  -0.003      
(0.008) 
-0.034***     
(0.006) 








Age>60  0.000      
(0.014) 
-0.020*      
(0.011) 










0.005      
(0.006) 
0.020***      
(0.006) 








University  0.002      
(0.011) 
0.068***      
(0.008) 








Single  -0.004      
(0.007) 
0.010*      
(0.006) 










-0.008***     
(0.003) 
-0.000     
(0.004) 








City   -0.009      
(0.011) 
0.026**      
(0.010) 








Big town  0.003      
(0.007) 
0.004      
(0.005) 








Unemployed   -0.012      
(0.008) 
-0.030***     
(0.005) 
0.058***      
(0.013) 






Pensioner   0.006      
(0.010) 
-0.020***     
(0.007) 










0.009      
(0.007) 
0.013**      
(0.006) 








2nd hh. income 
quartile 
0.004      
(0.007) 
0.006      
(0.005) 
-0.016      
(0.011) 






3rd hh. income 
quartile 
0.007      
(0.009) 
0.021***      
(0.004) 








4th hh. income  
quartile 
0.032***     
(0.009) 
0.071***      
(0.009) 








Observations 17389  9779  31271 17323  18684  19674 





Notes:   Marginal effects from multinomial logit. Standard errors clustered by country are reported in parentheses. * 
significant at 10 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; *** significant at 1 percent.  All variables definitions as in Tables 
3 and 4 column (4). Additional regressors include interactions between country and year dummies. Baseline groups 
















Table 7. Determinants of support: Alternative dependent variables 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 




Return to communism 
Probit, ME 
Female -9.510**  -9.195**  -7.413**  -7.576**  0.019**  0.020*** 
 (3.469)  (3.482)  (2.638)  (2.684)  (0.007)  (0.007) 
Young_cohort 6.545*** 7.432*** 5.331*** 6.235***  -0.007  -0.009 
 (1.526)  (1.323)  (1.400)  (1.317)  (0.008)  (0.008) 
Age 30-39  -3.074**  -3.488**  -2.880**  -3.155***  0.017  0.018 
 (1.249)  (1.212)  (1.107)  (1.047)  (0.012)  (0.011) 
Age 40-49  -10.918***  -10.591***  -10.301***  -9.641***  0.070***  0.070*** 
 (1.757)  (1.783)  (1.425)  (1.324)  (0.012)  (0.011) 
Age  50-59  -12.415*** -12.486*** -11.804*** -11.819***  0.082***  0.082*** 
 (1.826)  (1.819)  (2.187)  (2.151)  (0.019)  (0.018) 
Age>60 -8.516**  -8.104**  -9.520**  -9.633**  0.082***  0.079*** 
 (3.394)  (3.414)  (3.918)  (4.089)  (0.026)  (0.024) 
Secondary /  5.572**  7.150**  10.091***  11.246***  -0.073***  -0.079*** 
vocational (2.309)  (2.378)  (2.294)  (2.392)  (0.010)  (0.010) 
University    19.857*** 21.844*** 25.919*** 27.458*** -0.124***  -0.129*** 
 (2.264)  (2.031)  (2.133)  (2.473)  (0.006)  (0.006) 
Single   5.257***  4.488**  3.556**  3.345**  -0.015  -0.011 
 (1.320)  (1.642)  (1.343)  (1.471)  (0.010)  (0.010) 
Divorced  /  1.721 1.036 0.553 0.735 0.010 0.012 
widowed (1.200)  (1.179)  (1.458)  (1.619)  (0.009)  (0.008) 
City   8.842**  8.379**  8.541**  7.876*  -0.040***  -0.040*** 
 (3.363)  (3.431)  (3.876)  (4.081)  (0.014)  (0.014) 
Big town  0.980  0.239  0.385  -1.192  -0.002  -0.000        
 (1.652)  (1.830)  (2.476)  (2.600)  (0.009)  (0.010) 
Unemployed   -12.135***  -12.733***  -9.568***  -10.342***  0.047***  0.047*** 
 (2.325)  (2.643)  (2.235)  (2.321)  (0.012)  (0.011) 
Pensioner   -4.546*  -5.025**  -2.397  -2.228  0.028***  0.030*** 
 (2.170)  (2.271)  (2.014)  (2.082)  (0.009)  (0.009) 
Student  /  5.284*** 4.704*** 5.561*** 5.148***  -0.002  -0.002 
housewife (1.242)  (1.219)  (1.569)  (1.502)  (0.008)  (0.009) 
2
nd hh. income  1.808  1.458  4.245***  3.410*  -0.027***  -0.024** 
quartile (1.565)  (1.801)  (1.258)  (1.718)  (0.010)  (0.011) 
3
rd hh. income  7.016**  6.335**  10.717***  9.871***  -0.060***  -0.054*** 
quartile (2.388)  (2.524)  (1.891)  (2.040)  (0.011)  (0.013) 
4
th hh. income  22.624***  21.231***  22.509***  21.314***  -0.100***  -0.095*** 
quartile (2.279)  (2.622)  (2.143)  (2.568)  (0.013)  (0.015) 
Bulgaria     -36.083***    -1.593    0.119*** 
   (0.666)    (1.183)    (0.006) 
Czech  Republic  36.765***  47.909***  -0.053*** 
   (1.164)    (1.842)    (0.005) 
Slovakia     -20.976***    -4.475***    0.095*** 
   (0.851)    (1.135)    (0.005) 
Hungary     -24.845***  -21.646***   0.031*** 
   (1.119)    (1.288)    (0.006) 
Poland     5.004***   12.838***   0.036*** 
   (1.070)    (1.359)    (0.006) 
Romania     -10.197***    28.203***    0.000        
   (2.264)    (2.063)    (0.012) 
Croatia     12.546***  18.568***  -0.057*** 
   (2.467)    (2.901)    (0.009) 
Belarus     -47.864***  -40.329***   0.245*** 
   (1.632)    (1.860)    (0.009) 
Ukraine     -67.958***  -49.247***   0.236*** 
   (1.315)    (1.825)    (0.005) 
Russia     -49.882***  -49.930***   0.256*** 
   (2.144)    (1.530)    (0.012) 
Estonia     -2.587  -2.273   -0.075*** 
   (2.596)    (2.280)    (0.007) 
Lithuania     -48.529***  -22.087***   -0.056*** 
   (2.516)    (2.403)    (0.009) 
Latvia     -37.048***  -22.365***   -0.095*** 
   (2.585)    (2.395)    (0.006) 
1991   -7.688  16.674    
   (9.378)    (12.188)     
1992   -22.630***    -2.792     
   (6.795)    (9.049)      
 
43
1993   -19.190**    2.827    -0.038* 
   (7.793)    (8.702)    (0.020) 
1995   -24.078**    0.065    -0.009 
   (10.531)  (10.851)   (0.034) 
1996   -18.191*    0.851    -0.013 
   (9.171)    (7.711)    (0.019) 
1998   -18.084*    -6.412    0.025 
   (9.994)    (12.955)    (0.034) 
2000   -25.831**    -8.574    0.011 
   (9.923)    (7.283)    (0.031) 
2001   0.944    -0.695    0.020 
   (8.064)    (7.586)    (0.026) 
Constant  -25.777*** -4.845 -13.568*** -0.877     
 (5.426)  (9.962)  (4.294)  (10.383)     
Observations  72012 72012 70532 70532 54553 54553 
R-squared  0.21 0.18 0.19 0.16     
Notes:  Standard errors clustered by country are reported in parentheses. * significant at 10 percent; ** significant at 
5 percent; *** significant at 1 percent. Dependent variables in columns (1)-(4) are the not standardized distance 
between the rankings of present and past economic systems, respectively. Dependent variable in columns (5), (6) is 
equal to one if individual agrees with the statement “we should return to Communist rule”. See Tables 3 and 4 for 










































Table 8. The impact of additional variables: Economic system. Dependent variable: distance 
  (1) (2) (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) (8) (9)  (10)  (11)  (12) 
Female  -0.203** -0.144**  -0.210** -0.120**  -0.129**  -0.050* -0.091** -0.051*** -0.102** -0.106***  -0.116*** -0.045** 
  (0.077) (0.062) (0.081)  (0.044)  (0.050)  (0.024)  (0.034) (0.014) (0.035) (0.035) (0.037) (0.016) 
Young_cohort  0.002  0.022  -0.037  0.078**  0.059**  0.094**  0.091** -0.026 0.062**  0.065**  0.069**  0.120*** 
  (0.043) (0.038) (0.036)  (0.028)  (0.024)  (0.035)  (0.035) (0.044) (0.027) (0.025) (0.024) (0.014) 
Age  30-39  -0.083*** -0.056*** -0.097***  -0.042* -0.057*** -0.027  -0.016  -0.038*  -0.052*** -0.048*** -0.050***  0.008 
  (0.010) (0.016) (0.026)  (0.021)  (0.017)  (0.040)  (0.024) (0.020) (0.016) (0.014) (0.013) (0.021) 
Age  40-49  -0.203*** -0.157*** -0.228***  -0.152***  -0.165***  -0.145***  -0.124*** -0.141*** -0.159*** -0.151*** -0.151*** -0.098*** 
  (0.020) (0.024) (0.030)  (0.025)  (0.022)  (0.047)  (0.024) (0.024) (0.019) (0.016) (0.018) (0.022) 
Age  50-59  -0.223*** -0.178*** -0.210***  -0.174***  -0.176***  -0.180***  -0.126*** -0.130*** -0.175*** -0.172*** -0.180*** -0.128*** 
  (0.030) (0.020) (0.035)  (0.030)  (0.023)  (0.047)  (0.031) (0.027) (0.023) (0.022) (0.023) (0.020) 
Age>60  -0.164*** -0.122**  -0.231*** -0.120** -0.122** -0.151*  -0.109**  -0.059  -0.147*** -0.140*** -0.148***  -0.091* 
  (0.050) (0.041) (0.053)  (0.050)  (0.042)  (0.072)  (0.047) (0.051) (0.045) (0.044) (0.047) (0.050) 
Secondary  /  0.048*  0.024  0.073*  0.062** 0.057*  0.111**  0.066**  0.072** 0.086***  0.090***  0.085*** 0.084** 
vocational  (0.023) (0.022) (0.038)  (0.028)  (0.027)  (0.048)  (0.026) (0.026) (0.025) (0.022) (0.025) (0.033) 
University    0.215*** 0.182*** 0.254***  0.226***  0.217***  0.311***  0.234*** 0.206*** 0.274*** 0.274*** 0.276*** 0.283*** 
  (0.031) (0.033) (0.035)  (0.028)  (0.028)  (0.040)  (0.035) (0.058) (0.032) (0.031) (0.031) (0.036) 
Single    0.050*  0.076***  0.059**  0.061*** 0.071***  0.109*** 0.067***  0.092**  0.078***  0.076***  0.087***  0.127*** 
  (0.025) (0.022) (0.024)  (0.017)  (0.017)  (0.029)  (0.018) (0.034) (0.020) (0.021) (0.020) (0.021) 
Divorced  /  0.034 0.061***  0.029  0.026  0.019 -0.006  0.005  0.070** 0.034** 0.031** 0.032**  0.031* 
widowed  (0.026) (0.020) (0.024)  (0.017)  (0.015)  (0.024)  (0.018) (0.026) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.014) 
City    0.193***  0.190***  0.191**  0.115**  0.106**  -0.015 0.085* 0.201***  0.119** 0.124** 0.124**  0.019 
  (0.047) (0.046) (0.065)  (0.044)  (0.044)  (0.051)  (0.043) (0.054) (0.048) (0.045) (0.046) (0.059) 
Big  town    0.023 0.039 0.039  0.018  0.009  -0.022  0.016 0.035 0.013 0.015 0.015  -0.024 
  (0.028) (0.022) (0.037)  (0.023)  (0.023)  (0.032)  (0.027) (0.035) (0.024) (0.024) (0.021) (0.024) 
Unemployed    -0.116** -0.139***  -0.157** -0.147***  -0.159***  -0.150***  -0.141*** -0.192*** -0.151*** -0.154*** -0.155*** -0.117*** 
  (0.040) (0.038) (0.053)  (0.030)  (0.031)  (0.030)  (0.029) (0.044) (0.031) (0.032) (0.033) (0.033) 
Pensioner    -0.069  -0.056*  0.001  -0.058* -0.057* -0.014 -0.046**  -0.110*** -0.061*  -0.066** -0.069**  -0.054 
  (0.039) (0.031) (0.052)  (0.028)  (0.030)  (0.032)  (0.021) (0.020) (0.028) (0.028) (0.029) (0.032) 
Student  /  0.100*** 0.102***  0.067** 0.076***  0.071*** 0.028  0.075**  0.128*** 0.073*** 0.074*** 0.067***  0.047 
housewife  (0.021) (0.025) (0.029)  (0.018)  (0.015)  (0.032)  (0.026) (0.036) (0.018) (0.018) (0.022) (0.031) 
2
nd  hh.  income  -0.026 -0.010 -0.023 0.019 0.017  0.125***  0.018  0.027  0.049*  0.044  0.044  0.109*** 
quartile  (0.035) (0.027) (0.028)  (0.022)  (0.025)  (0.023)  (0.027) (0.034) (0.026) (0.027) (0.029) (0.026) 
3
rd  hh.  income    0.056  0.067*  0.080  0.093** 0.093**  0.212*** 0.065*  0.154*** 0.132*** 0.126*** 0.126*** 0.210*** 
quartile  (0.050) (0.034) (0.051)  (0.033)  (0.034)  (0.042)  (0.033) (0.028) (0.035) (0.036) (0.038) (0.036) 
4
th  hh.  income  0.267*** 0.216*** 0.257***  0.295***  0.304***  0.453***  0.251*** 0.275*** 0.342*** 0.337*** 0.340*** 0.434*** 
quartile  (0.043) (0.043) (0.031)  (0.035)  (0.031)  (0.063)  (0.029) (0.034) (0.042) (0.042) (0.039) (0.058) 
 Nrw.  hardship   
-0.003*** 
Going without  
-0.062*** 




















  (0.001) (0.007) (0.050)  (0.036)  (0.024)  (0.032)  (0.025) (0.027) (0.016) (0.015) (0.013) (0.011) 
     Ref.  slow 
-0.283*** 
            
     (0.047)              
Constant  0.085  -0.342***  0.319**  -0.259***  -0.275***  -0.345***  -0.290*** -0.459*** -0.629*** -0.662*** -0.724*** -0.638*** 
  (0.100) (0.084) (0.140)  (0.072)  (0.075)  (0.070)  (0.060) (0.039) (0.065) (0.065) (0.094) (0.073) 
Observations  27834 33608 14392  60607  59298  16040  37363 18271 53698 54279 51135 25092 
R-squared 0.27 0.28 0.31  0.24  0.25  0.15  0.24 0.33 0.24 0.24 0.25 0.19 
 
Notes:   Estimation method: OLS. Standard errors clustered by country are in parentheses. * significant at 10 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; *** significant at 1 





Table 9. The impact of additional variables: Political system. Dependent variable: distance 
  (1) (2)  (3) (4) (5)  (6) (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11) (12) 
Female  -0.133** -0.093**  -0.130**  -0.088***  -0.089***  -0.054** -0.057**  -0.059*** -0.077***  -0.078***  -0.084*** -0.042*** 
 (0.049)  (0.041)  (0.046)  (0.026)  (0.029)  (0.021)  (0.022)  (0.013)  (0.023)  (0.022)  (0.024)  (0.012) 
Young_cohort -0.013  0.004  -0.026 0.071***  0.053***  0.084* 0.101***  -0.031  0.062***  0.063***  0.054**  0.079** 
 (0.029)  (0.030)  (0.035)  (0.023)  (0.016)  (0.042)  (0.033)  (0.038)  (0.019)  (0.019)  (0.023)  (0.035) 
Age 30-39  -0.060***  -0.046**  -0.068  -0.033*  -0.035**  0.027  0.007  -0.069**  -0.025  -0.025  -0.030*  0.020 
 (0.016)  (0.017)  (0.040)  (0.016)  (0.015)  (0.051)  (0.021)  (0.027)  (0.016)  (0.016)  (0.015)  (0.036) 
Age 40-49  -0.160***  -0.143***  -0.197***  -0.123***  -0.129***  -0.091**  -0.098***  -0.145***  -0.129***  -0.121***  -0.130***  -0.101*** 
 (0.018)  (0.019)  (0.025)  (0.020)  (0.014)  (0.040)  (0.024)  (0.028)  (0.015)  (0.017)  (0.015)  (0.031) 
Age  50-59  -0.175***  -0.176***  -0.192***  -0.146***  -0.139***  -0.131** -0.083**  -0.157*** -0.140***  -0.135***  -0.152*** -0.135*** 
 (0.041)  (0.020)  (0.056)  (0.036)  (0.030)  (0.044)  (0.030)  (0.020)  (0.022)  (0.023)  (0.023)  (0.031) 
Age>60 -0.127**  -0.157***  -0.175*  -0.118**  -0.108**  -0.110*  -0.087*  -0.154***  -0.133**  -0.125**  -0.149***  -0.149*** 
 (0.051)  (0.046)  (0.081)  (0.052)  (0.048)  (0.056)  (0.043)  (0.045)  (0.046)  (0.046)  (0.047)  (0.047) 
Secondary /  0.124***  0.085***  0.106***  0.103***  0.097***  0.129**  0.110***  0.118***  0.124***  0.127***  0.121***  0.091** 
vocational (0.027)  (0.025)  (0.028)  (0.023)  (0.024)  (0.055)  (0.022)  (0.029)  (0.026)  (0.025)  (0.026)  (0.036) 
University   0.305***  0.257***  0.307***  0.262***  0.255***  0.307***  0.269***  0.309***  0.321***  0.319***  0.322***  0.278*** 
 (0.035)  (0.033)  (0.032)  (0.022)  (0.023)  (0.039)  (0.026)  (0.053)  (0.025)  (0.024)  (0.024)  (0.031) 
Single   0.035  0.039  0.025  0.039**  0.050***  0.112***  0.028  0.037  0.056***  0.056***  0.071***  0.105*** 
 (0.032)  (0.025)  (0.043)  (0.015)  (0.016)  (0.024)  (0.019)  (0.031)  (0.015)  (0.016)  (0.014)  (0.021) 
Divorced /  0.023  0.032  0.040  0.013  0.010  0.021  -0.014  0.012  0.015  0.015  0.016  0.029 
widowed (0.027)  (0.027)  (0.034)  (0.018)  (0.018)  (0.034)  (0.014)  (0.030)  (0.017)  (0.017)  (0.015)  (0.028) 
City   0.154**  0.161***  0.148**  0.107**  0.090*  -0.001  0.062  0.187***  0.119**  0.122**  0.122**  0.029 
 (0.055)  (0.042)  (0.066)  (0.044)  (0.047)  (0.054)  (0.051)  (0.051)  (0.047)  (0.046)  (0.045)  (0.051) 
Big town  0.028  0.041  0.020  0.009  0.005  -0.061  -0.012  0.055  0.012  0.014  0.018  -0.035 
 (0.041)  (0.029)  (0.047)  (0.028)  (0.034)  (0.040)  (0.038)  (0.043)  (0.029)  (0.029)  (0.029)  (0.030) 
Unemployed   -0.046  -0.073**  -0.122**  -0.090***  -0.111***  -0.089**  -0.108***  -0.083**  -0.110***  -0.114***  -0.106***  -0.069** 
 (0.040)  (0.033)  (0.050)  (0.023)  (0.027)  (0.031)  (0.027)  (0.035)  (0.027)  (0.028)  (0.029)  (0.024) 
Pensioner   -0.062*  -0.003  -0.026  -0.026  -0.035  -0.028  -0.023  -0.023  -0.047*  -0.050*  -0.048*  -0.018 
 (0.033)  (0.024)  (0.036)  (0.021)  (0.023)  (0.044)  (0.019)  (0.031)  (0.024)  (0.024)  (0.025)  (0.035) 
Student /  0.062  0.069**  0.071*  0.074***  0.067***  0.075***  0.063**  0.110**  0.065**  0.064**  0.060**  0.081*** 
housewife (0.036)  (0.025)  (0.038)  (0.021)  (0.020)  (0.021)  (0.024)  (0.047)  (0.022)  (0.023)  (0.022)  (0.020) 
2
nd hh. income  0.011  0.036**  0.026  0.058***  0.039**  0.118**  0.040**  0.057**  0.054**  0.059**  0.059**  0.118** 
quartile (0.027)  (0.016)  (0.026)  (0.017)  (0.018)  (0.047)  (0.018)  (0.019)  (0.022)  (0.021)  (0.022)  (0.041) 
3
rd hh. income  0.094**  0.110***  0.120***  0.137***  0.120***  0.212***  0.096***  0.173***  0.144***  0.151***  0.151***  0.216*** 
quartile (0.040)  (0.022)  (0.038)  (0.022)  (0.023)  (0.059)  (0.025)  (0.028)  (0.032)  (0.030)  (0.029)  (0.046) 
4
th hh. income  0.233***  0.220***  0.239***  0.267***  0.258***  0.409***  0.221***  0.278***  0.297***  0.302***  0.303***  0.400*** 
quartile (0.045)  (0.035)  (0.039)  (0.029)  (0.027)  (0.073)  (0.030)  (0.039)  (0.034)  (0.034)  (0.029)  (0.062) 
























 (0.001)  (0.006)  (0.037)  (0.061)  (0.023)  (0.036)  (0.024)  (0.034)  (0.019)  (0.018)  (0.018)  (0.010) 
     Ref.  slow 
-0.172*** 
              
     (0.045)                   
Constant 0.009  0.064  -0.114  -0.042  -0.068  -0.091  -0.062  -0.026  -0.459***  -0.508***  -0.608***  -0.416*** 
 (0.068)  (0.055)  (0.091)  (0.051)  (0.050)  (0.069)  (0.059)  (0.047)  (0.065)  (0.068)  (0.101)  (0.082) 
Observations 27219  33011 14131  59771  58238  15730  36543  18147  52854  53390  50274  24741 
R-squared 0.21  0.24  0.24  0.22  0.21  0.12  0.20  0.27 0.20  0.21  0.21  0.16 
Notes:   Estimation method: OLS. Standard errors clustered by country are in parentheses. * significant at 10 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; *** significant at 1 





Table 10.  Determinants of support - present versus past by country: Economic system 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10)  (11)  (12)  (13)  (14) 
 Czech 
Republic 
Slovakia  Hungary Poland Slovenia Estonia  Latvia Lithuania  Bulgaria  Romania Croatia  Russia  Ukraine Belarus 
Female  0.038  -0.032  -0.076**  -0.035  -0.117*** -0.389*** -0.490*** -0.440***  -0.062**  0.008  -0.062  -0.038**  -0.045  -0.020 
  (0.031) (0.032) (0.032) (0.029) (0.034) (0.028) (0.029) (0.024) (0.025) (0.033) (0.046) (0.017) (0.030) (0.035) 
Young_cohort  0.072 0.085  -0.135*  -0.097  0.102 0.070 0.113 0.066  0.099*  0.116  -0.007  0.130***  0.010 0.006 
  (0.068) (0.072) (0.071) (0.066) (0.083) (0.058) (0.069) (0.059) (0.058) (0.071) (0.119) (0.035) (0.064) (0.082) 
Age  30-39 -0.117**  0.061  -0.078 -0.055 -0.005  -0.152***  -0.029 -0.078 -0.016  0.048  0.062 -0.057*  -0.022 -0.058 
  (0.057) (0.061) (0.057) (0.053) (0.070) (0.047) (0.055) (0.049) (0.053) (0.060) (0.075) (0.031) (0.058) (0.071) 
Age  40-49  -0.197***  -0.115*  -0.236*** -0.188***  -0.059  -0.320*** -0.163*** -0.139*** -0.181***  -0.020  0.020  -0.117*** -0.198*** -0.197*** 
  (0.057) (0.064) (0.059) (0.056) (0.075) (0.050) (0.057) (0.051) (0.054) (0.063) (0.078) (0.033) (0.059) (0.069) 
Age  50-59  -0.285*** -0.027 -0.217***  -0.258*** -0.014 -0.348***  -0.161***  -0.155***  -0.166*** -0.035  -0.028 -0.221***  -0.154**  -0.274*** 
  (0.063) (0.071) (0.066) (0.065) (0.074) (0.052) (0.060) (0.053) (0.055) (0.066) (0.087) (0.035) (0.063) (0.076) 
Age>60  -0.157* 0.014  -0.128 -0.083  0.089  -0.423***  -0.113 -0.014  -0.191***  0.134* 0.171  -0.287***  -0.167**  -0.236** 
  (0.084) (0.084) (0.078) (0.071) (0.069) (0.061) (0.070) (0.065) (0.063) (0.073) (0.110) (0.042) (0.068) (0.092) 
Secondary  /  0.162***  0.116***  0.125***  0.132***  0.028  0.052  0.049  -0.029 0.219*** -0.029  0.013  0.074*** -0.006  -0.004 
vocational  (0.043) (0.043) (0.038) (0.037) (0.040) (0.035) (0.041) (0.034) (0.032) (0.043) (0.060) (0.025) (0.041) (0.048) 
University    0.356*** 0.216*** 0.467*** 0.472*** 0.266*** 0.215*** 0.257*** 0.299*** 0.282***  0.062  0.034  0.260***  0.124**  -0.107* 
  (0.060) (0.063) (0.055) (0.056) (0.055) (0.042) (0.049) (0.042) (0.046) (0.064) (0.074) (0.029) (0.051) (0.063) 
Single    -0.046  0.049  0.059 0.136***  0.176***  -0.009  0.091*  0.120***  0.095**  0.133**  0.028 0.098***  0.137*** 0.040 
  (0.055) (0.054) (0.056) (0.046) (0.046) (0.040) (0.048) (0.043) (0.037) (0.054) (0.071) (0.027) (0.052) (0.066) 
Divorced  /  0.033 -0.020 0.024 -0.018 0.003  0.024  -0.063*  0.004  0.090**  0.111**  -0.064  0.053**  -0.040  -0.026 
widowed  (0.049) (0.051) (0.046) (0.045) (0.057) (0.035) (0.037) (0.032) (0.036) (0.052) (0.073) (0.023) (0.038) (0.047) 
City    0.247***  0.367***  0.156***  0.210*** 0.025 0.155***  0.065*  0.196***  0.241*** 0.016  -0.007  0.231*** 0.040  -0.052 
  (0.043) (0.051) (0.044) (0.036) (0.051) (0.034) (0.037) (0.032) (0.034) (0.044) (0.060) (0.024) (0.037) (0.045) 
Big  town  0.166***  0.022  0.026  0.119*** -0.026  0.079**  0.010  0.097*** -0.011  -0.062  0.064  0.033* -0.082**  0.019 
  (0.034) (0.034) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.033) (0.036) (0.030) (0.032) (0.040) (0.054) (0.020) (0.036) (0.044) 
Unemployed    -0.168**  -0.177***  -0.102*  -0.160*** -0.211*** -0.157*** -0.139*** -0.155***  -0.090**  -0.251*** -0.312***  -0.024  -0.233*** 0.025 
  (0.083) (0.056) (0.061) (0.052) (0.062) (0.050) (0.049) (0.041) (0.039) (0.063) (0.092) (0.035) (0.052) (0.086) 
Pensioner    -0.099  -0.106  0.063  -0.015  -0.042 -0.086* -0.018  0.061  -0.066  -0.041 -0.164* 0.058*  -0.120***  -0.057 
  (0.065) (0.066) (0.056) (0.053) (0.046) (0.045) (0.053) (0.047) (0.046) (0.057) (0.095) (0.031) (0.045) (0.072) 
Student  /  0.078  0.243***  0.133* 0.096*  0.135** 0.061  -0.053  0.010  0.031  0.096  -0.031  0.067** 0.046  0.235*** 
housewife  (0.078) (0.081) (0.069) (0.052) (0.055) (0.051) (0.057) (0.044) (0.062) (0.059) (0.077) (0.032) (0.056) (0.085) 
2nd  hh.  inc.  0.044  0.027  0.089* 0.103** -0.059  -0.102***  -0.006  -0.006  0.053  0.124**  0.018 0.081*** 0.017  0.022 
Quartile  (0.048) (0.050) (0.047) (0.041) (0.049) (0.036) (0.039) (0.033) (0.036) (0.051) (0.060) (0.023) (0.040) (0.049) 
3rd hh. inc.  0.177***  0.084*  0.145***  0.137***  0.089*  -0.049  -0.009  0.043  0.144***  0.225***  -0.060  0.187***  0.104**  0.101* 
Quartile  (0.051) (0.050) (0.050) (0.041) (0.051) (0.036) (0.040) (0.033) (0.039) (0.054) (0.065) (0.025) (0.042) (0.052) 
4th  hh.  inc.  0.330*** 0.341*** 0.347*** 0.221*** 0.171*** 0.180*** 0.270*** 0.343*** 0.317*** 0.263***  0.059  0.414*** 0.220*** 0.236*** 
quartile  (0.053) (0.052) (0.052) (0.045) (0.053) (0.036) (0.041) (0.037) (0.043) (0.057) (0.066) (0.026) (0.043) (0.057) 
1991 0.053  0.090  -0.060  0.090*  -0.163***      0.415***  0.310***      
  (0.057)  (0.070)  (0.059)  (0.053)  (0.053)      (0.045)  (0.051)      
1992 -0.072    -0.274***  -0.040        0.088*  -0.030  -0.299***  -1.046***   
  (0.048)  (0.056)  (0.062)  (0.053)        (0.050)  (0.053)  (0.034)  (0.052)   
1993  0.120**  -0.234***  -0.272*** 0.178***  0.323*** -0.422*** 0.261*** -0.855***  -0.162***      -0.008  -0.723***  -1.178*** 
  (0.048) (0.057) (0.058) (0.053) (0.053) (0.045) (0.041) (0.041) (0.044)      (0.033) (0.045) (0.054) 
1995  0.147***  -0.033  -0.280*** 0.691***  0.295*** -0.387*** 0.300*** -1.071***  -0.230***      -0.374***  -1.043***  -1.291*** 
  (0.050) (0.047) (0.056) (0.052) (0.056) (0.047) (0.046) (0.046) (0.044)      (0.033) (0.043) (0.053) 




           (0.048)  (0.044)      (0.031)    
1998    -0.037     -0.062      0.284***  0.202***    -0.198***  -1.175***  -0.689*** 
   (0.049)    (0.056)      (0.045)  (0.049)  (0.034)  (0.044)  (0.054) 
2000        -0.013  0.169***  -0.878***      -0.317***    
        (0.052)  (0.048)  (0.043)      (0.033)    
2001      0.330***  0.048  0.042  0.739***  -0.395***  0.441***     0.044    
      (0.058) (0.055)    (0.049) (0.049) (0.042) (0.040)      (0.032)     
Minority          -0.630***  -0.299***  -0.146***        
        (0.027)  (0.030)  (0.027)        
Constant  -0.042  -0.696*** -0.679*** -0.496*** -0.376***  0.539***  -0.761***  -0.130*  -0.875*** -0.657***  -0.058  -0.988*** -0.502*** -0.051 
  (0.090) (0.092) (0.090) (0.080) (0.092) (0.070) (0.073) (0.072) (0.074) (0.087) (0.092) (0.050) (0.079) (0.097) 
Observations  4386 3801 4168 4704 3639 5494 4310 6317 5952 3740 1971  14661  4653 3434 
R-squared 0.07 0.08 0.11 0.13 0.08 0.25 0.19 0.22 0.16 0.04 0.01 0.11 0.24 0.21 
Notes:   Estimation method: OLS. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; *** significant at 1 percent.  All variables 




































Table 11.  Determinants of support - present versus past by country: Political system 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10)  (11)  (12)  (13)  (14) 
 Czech 
Republic 
Slovakia  Hungary Poland Slovenia Estonia  Latvia Lithuania  Bulgaria  Romania Croatia  Russia  Ukraine Belarus 
Female  0.026  -0.040 -0.053  -0.078***  -0.073**  -0.324***  -0.254***  -0.258***  -0.081***    -0.001 -0.010 -0.040 -0.056 
  (0.031) (0.032) (0.033) (0.030) (0.034) (0.029) (0.033) (0.026) (0.025) (0.033) (0.046) (0.017) (0.030) (0.035) 
Young_cohort  0.049  -0.091 -0.009 -0.010 -0.016  0.133** 0.092 0.130** 0.004  0.051 0.228** 0.056  0.035  -0.024 
  (0.068) (0.069) (0.075) (0.064) (0.081) (0.055) (0.071) (0.057) (0.056) (0.072) (0.104) (0.034) (0.060) (0.081) 
Age  30-39  -0.061  0.033  -0.016 -0.036 -0.061 -0.075  0.042  0.047 -0.098* 0.047  0.020 -0.054*  -0.053  -0.123* 
  (0.056) (0.060) (0.060) (0.054) (0.069) (0.046) (0.057) (0.049) (0.051) (0.060) (0.076) (0.031) (0.053) (0.070) 
Age  40-49  -0.050  -0.157**  -0.114*  -0.150*** -0.213*** -0.170***  -0.026  -0.061  -0.203***  -0.050  0.071  -0.167*** -0.163***  -0.160** 
  (0.056) (0.062) (0.062) (0.058) (0.073) (0.049) (0.059) (0.050) (0.052) (0.063) (0.076) (0.032) (0.058) (0.071) 
Age  50-59  -0.129**  -0.061  -0.042  -0.161** -0.180**  -0.184***  0.031  -0.089* -0.237***  -0.144**  0.088  -0.257***  -0.227***  -0.210*** 
  (0.063) (0.069) (0.069) (0.066) (0.071) (0.052) (0.063) (0.053) (0.055) (0.067) (0.084) (0.035) (0.061) (0.078) 
Age>60  -0.023  -0.073  0.132  -0.124*  -0.044 -0.248***  0.070  0.079  -0.250*** -0.100  0.149  -0.325***  -0.252***  -0.391*** 
  (0.083) (0.084) (0.082) (0.072) (0.066) (0.061) (0.077) (0.066) (0.063) (0.073) (0.114) (0.043) (0.069) (0.093) 
Secondary  /  0.245***  0.164***  0.210***  0.131*** 0.056  0.069*  0.065  0.042 0.230*** 0.057  0.046 0.101***  0.084**  0.042 
vocational  (0.043) (0.043) (0.039) (0.037) (0.040) (0.036) (0.047) (0.037) (0.033) (0.042) (0.060) (0.025) (0.042) (0.051) 
University    0.421*** 0.309*** 0.501*** 0.469*** 0.302*** 0.247*** 0.204*** 0.395*** 0.307*** 0.287***  -0.013  0.284*** 0.293***  0.037 
  (0.061) (0.064) (0.055) (0.057) (0.058) (0.043) (0.055) (0.043) (0.045) (0.062) (0.072) (0.030) (0.051) (0.067) 
Single    0.003  0.049  0.089  0.094*  0.085* -0.099** 0.093*  0.073*  0.041  0.105*  0.010  0.070*** 0.083*  -0.009 
  (0.054) (0.051) (0.055) (0.049) (0.045) (0.039) (0.051) (0.043) (0.037) (0.055) (0.071) (0.027) (0.050) (0.062) 
Divorced  /  0.006  -0.023 -0.044 -0.023  -0.113*  0.086**    -0.048 -0.009 -0.039 -0.103  0.058**  -0.050 -0.061 
Widowed  (0.049) (0.053) (0.046) (0.045) (0.059) (0.038) (0.041) (0.035) (0.035) (0.053) (0.068) (0.023) (0.039) (0.050) 
City    0.271*** 0.366***  0.085*  0.162*** 0.146*** 0.187*** 0.111*** 0.331*** 0.209***  0.038  0.046  0.183***  -0.195***  0.052 
  (0.043) (0.050) (0.044) (0.036) (0.050) (0.035) (0.041) (0.033) (0.034) (0.044) (0.058) (0.024) (0.038) (0.046) 
Big  town  0.146***  0.080**  -0.040 0.056 -0.015 0.038  0.094**  0.170***  -0.030  0.085**  0.033  0.027  -0.273***  0.026 
  (0.034) (0.034) (0.036) (0.037) (0.037) (0.034) (0.041) (0.032) (0.032) (0.041) (0.055) (0.020) (0.037) (0.045) 
Unemployed    -0.119 -0.066  -0.103*  -0.082 -0.064 -0.082  -0.190***  -0.076*  -0.111***  -0.050  -0.277***  -0.003 -0.089  0.094 
  (0.086) (0.059) (0.062) (0.052) (0.063) (0.050) (0.051) (0.042) (0.040) (0.064) (0.088) (0.036) (0.055) (0.085) 
Pensioner    -0.095  -0.027  -0.029  0.058  -0.042  -0.042  -0.026  0.094* -0.096**  0.126** -0.194*  0.036  -0.018  0.067 
  (0.065) (0.067) (0.056) (0.054) (0.046) (0.048) (0.059) (0.050) (0.047) (0.058) (0.099) (0.032) (0.050) (0.070) 
Student  /  0.101  0.301***  0.104 0.129** 0.052  0.034  -0.082  0.065  0.002  0.107*  -0.205***  0.080***  0.035  0.284*** 
Housewife  (0.073) (0.077) (0.070) (0.052) (0.058) (0.052) (0.067) (0.046) (0.058) (0.058) (0.079) (0.031) (0.054) (0.080) 
2nd  hh.  inc.  0.031  0.093* 0.097**  0.061  0.045 -0.077** -0.030  0.038 0.126***  0.114**  0.075 0.091***  -0.017  0.041 
Quartile  (0.049) (0.051) (0.047) (0.041) (0.049) (0.036) (0.043) (0.035) (0.039) (0.050) (0.061) (0.024) (0.041) (0.051) 
3rd hh. inc.  0.136***  0.196***  0.195***  0.088**  0.211***  -0.036  0.015  0.066*  0.229***  0.204***  0.044  0.183***  0.075*  0.119** 
Quartile  (0.051) (0.052) (0.050) (0.041) (0.051) (0.037) (0.046) (0.035) (0.041) (0.051) (0.063) (0.025) (0.044) (0.054) 
4th  hh.  inc.  0.256*** 0.372*** 0.385*** 0.207*** 0.297*** 0.121***  0.110**  0.239*** 0.387*** 0.246***  0.077  0.346*** 0.123***  0.137** 
quartile  (0.052) (0.054) (0.053) (0.045) (0.054) (0.036) (0.044) (0.037) (0.044) (0.057) (0.065) (0.026) (0.044) (0.058) 
1991  0.379***  0.273***  0.190***  0.293***  0.128**      0.892***  0.794***      
  (0.057)  (0.071)  (0.061)  (0.054)  (0.054)      (0.045)  (0.051)      
1992  0.176***  0.299***  -0.353***  0.236***        0.495***  0.055  -0.255***  -0.279***   
  (0.047)  (0.056)  (0.064)  (0.054)        (0.050)  (0.053)  (0.035)  (0.052)   
1993  0.416***  0.188***  0.031  0.477***  0.420*** -0.054 0.164***  -0.124***  0.461***      0.031 -0.426***  -0.756*** 
  (0.049) (0.058) (0.058) (0.055) (0.054) (0.046) (0.050) (0.043) (0.044)      (0.034) (0.045) (0.054) 
1995  0.269*** 0.276***  -0.090  0.835*** 0.425*** 0.159*** 0.272***  -0.301***  0.425***      -0.216***  -0.636***  -0.766*** 
  (0.050) (0.047) (0.057) (0.053) (0.056) (0.048) (0.054) (0.048) (0.043)      (0.034) (0.044) (0.054) 




        (0.048)  (0.055)  (0.046)      (0.031)    
1998    0.161***     -0.009      0.475***  0.391***    -0.141***  -1.099***  -0.311*** 
   (0.050)    (0.058)      (0.045)  (0.050)  (0.035)  (0.046)  (0.053) 
2000           -0.153***  -0.298***      -0.161***    
           (0.053)  (0.044)      (0.034)    
2001     0.075  0.029   -0.049  0.018  -0.239***  0.419***     0.008    
      (0.059) (0.056)    (0.049) (0.055) (0.043) (0.040)      (0.033)     
Minority          -0.787***  -0.518***  -0.330***        
        (0.028)  (0.033)  (0.027)        
Constant  0.106 -0.454***  -0.444***  -0.188** -0.112 0.541*** -0.129  -0.136*  -0.496***  -0.195**  0.333***  -0.645***  0.135*  0.152 
  (0.089) (0.092) (0.093) (0.080) (0.092) (0.071) (0.085) (0.072) (0.073) (0.084) (0.092) (0.050) (0.079) (0.102) 
Observations  4398 3771 4025 4612 3574 5313 3914 6040 5941 3708 1971  14632  4512 3387 
R-squared 0.07 0.08 0.10 0.12 0.08 0.22 0.11 0.12 0.17 0.10 0.02 0.08 0.19 0.12 
Notes:   Estimation method: OLS. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; *** significant at 1 percent. All variables 
definitions are as in Table 4.   



































Table 12: The role of individual preferences in explaining the lower support in CIS 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12)  (13)  (14) 





























  (0.056) (0.059) (0.055) (0.065) (0.057) (0.056) (0.057) (0.065)  (0.058)  (0.059)  (0.057)  (0.071) (0.076) (0.000) 
Belarus  -0.824*** -0.686*** -0.830*** -0.746*** -0.834*** -1.144*** -0.606*** -0.664***  -0.613***  -0.495***  -0.622***  -0.553*** -0.553*** -0.217*** 
  (0.019) (0.039) (0.019) (0.065) (0.020) (0.067) (0.024) (0.022)  (0.024)  (0.025)  (0.023)  (0.011) (0.009) (0.015) 
Ukraine  -1.097*** -0.934*** -1.098*** -0.923*** -1.107*** -1.314*** -1.005*** -1.009***  -1.008***  -0.884***  -1.020***  -0.968*** -0.794*** -0.489*** 
  (0.012) (0.023) (0.013) (0.035) (0.013) (0.047) (0.018) (0.028)  (0.018)  (0.024)  (0.017)  (0.019) (0.032) (0.012) 
Russia    -0.697*** -0.389*** -0.709*** -0.369*** -0.709*** -0.830*** -0.550*** -0.511***  -0.556***  -0.423***  -0.576***  -0.401*** -0.549*** -0.399*** 
  (0.047) (0.035) (0.046) (0.036) (0.047) (0.047) (0.088) (0.091)  (0.087)  (0.078)  (0.088)  (0.087) (0.078) (0.072) 














   (0.007)  (0.010)  (0.009)  (0.019)    (0.013)    (0.026)   (0.121) 















   (0.008)  (0.010)  (0.009)  (0.019)    (0.015)    (0.016)   (0.079) 














   (0.005)  (0.004)  (0.011)  (0.039)    (0.014)    (0.038)   (0.017) 
Constant  -0.067  -0.421***  -0.053  -0.497***  -0.039  -0.252*  -0.170 -0.065  -0.172  -0.137  -0.171  -0.041 -0.161  -0.173* 
  (0.144) (0.132) (0.144) (0.120) (0.144) (0.121) (0.157) (0.157)  (0.156)  (0.148)  (0.158)  (0.154) (0.133) (0.082) 
Obs.  53698 53698 54279 54279 51135 51135 37363 37363  37261  37261  36164  36164 26921  26921 
R-squared  0.19 0.21 0.19 0.22 0.19 0.22 0.18 0.20  0.18  0.21  0.19  0.21 0.16 0.17 
                     
  Support for political system change 
                     
Belarus    -0.588*** -0.380*** -0.594*** -0.421***  -0.597***  -0.819*** -0.403*** -0.460***  -0.409***  -0.333***  -0.416*** -0.305*** -0.417*** -0.076*** 
  (0.019) (0.033) (0.020) (0.052)  (0.020)  (0.054) (0.025) (0.024)  (0.025)  (0.027)  (0.024) (0.013) (0.008) (0.019) 
Ukraine    -0.716*** -0.534*** -0.716*** -0.576***  -0.718***  -1.162*** -0.586*** -0.559***  -0.593***  -0.479***  -0.614*** -0.481*** -0.394*** -0.053*** 
  (0.011) (0.020) (0.011) (0.032)  (0.012)  (0.044) (0.024) (0.033)  (0.024)  (0.031)  (0.023) (0.029) (0.028) (0.013) 
Russia    -0.653*** -0.247*** -0.662*** -0.210***  -0.662***  -0.958*** -0.625*** -0.615***  -0.633***  -0.553***  -0.643*** -0.499*** -0.611*** -0.497*** 
  (0.031) (0.026) (0.032) (0.029)  (0.032)  (0.030) (0.089) (0.093)  (0.089)  (0.081)  (0.088) (0.092) (0.057) (0.061) 














   (0.005)  (0.008)    (0.007)  (0.020)    (0.013)   (0.023)  (0.103) 














   (0.007)  (0.010)    (0.009)  (0.019)    (0.018)   (0.014)  (0.070) 














   (0.005)  (0.004)    (0.008)  (0.031)    (0.012)   (0.036)  (0.018) 
Constant  0.023 -0.431*** 0.027 -0.543***  0.053  -0.188*  -0.038  0.089  -0.035  0.002  -0.042  0.122  -0.048  -0.042 
  (0.124) (0.113) (0.124) (0.100)  (0.122)  (0.095) (0.155) (0.154)  (0.155)  (0.148)  (0.153) (0.147) (0.106) (0.066) 
Obs.  52854 52854 53390 53390  50274  50274 36543 36543  36433  36433  35442 35442 26207 26207 
R-squared  0.16 0.19 0.16 0.19  0.15  0.20 0.15 0.17  0.15  0.17  0.15 0.19 0.12 0.14 
       
Notes: Estimation method: OLS. Standard errors clustered by country are in parentheses. * significant at 10 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; *** significant at 1 
percent. Additional controls include individual characteristics as in Table 3, country fixed effects, year dummies and interactions of country dummies and additional 




Table 13: The role of macroeconomic and institutional determinants in explaining the lower support in CIS: Economic system 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Czech  Republic  0.520*** 0.407*** 0.344*** 0.202*** 0.415*** 0.527*** 0.532*** 
  (0.014) (0.038) (0.043) (0.054) (0.081) (0.108) (0.135) 
Slovakia   -0.255***  -0.377*  -0.391**  -0.647**  -0.655  -0.385  -0.176 
  (0.012) (0.186) (0.174) (0.216) (0.396) (0.506) (0.365) 
Hungary    -0.385*** -0.385*** -0.466*** -0.617***  -0.700**  -0.589  -0.339 
  (0.014) (0.120) (0.115) (0.145) (0.287) (0.333) (0.277) 
Poland  0.119***  0.071  0.010  0.074 -0.135 0.052  0.604 
  (0.012) (0.252) (0.236) (0.349) (0.456) (0.540) (0.440) 
Estonia    -0.036 -0.344 -0.384 -0.446 -0.945 -0.773 -0.716 
  (0.035) (0.296) (0.276) (0.484) (0.671) (0.767) (0.581) 
Lithuania   -0.679***  -0.675**  -0.635**  -0.545  -1.017*  -0.805  -0.727 
  (0.034) (0.256) (0.237) (0.342) (0.508) (0.611) (0.444) 
Latvia -0.532***  -0.703*  -0.690**  -0.792  -1.303*  -0.943  -0.819 
  (0.035) (0.327) (0.303) (0.467) (0.692) (0.845) (0.664) 
Bulgaria  -0.367***  -0.465 -0.395 -0.714 -1.271 -0.653  0.273 
  (0.009) (0.348) (0.320) (0.508) (0.773) (1.017) (0.704) 
Romania   -0.101***  -0.424  -0.369  -1.065*  -1.484  -0.684  0.670 
  (0.031) (0.364) (0.327) (0.558) (0.907) (1.173) (0.819) 
Croatia   0.218***  -0.485  -0.475         
 (0.036)  (0.428)  (0.402)         
Russia   -0.689***  -1.094***  -1.033***  -1.380*  -2.129**  -0.902  1.629* 
  (0.027) (0.356) (0.328) (0.667) (0.922) (1.361) (0.911) 
Ukraine   -1.054***  -1.424***  -1.301***  -2.064**  -2.599**  -1.372  0.578 
  (0.018) (0.452) (0.414) (0.727) (1.141) (1.569) (1.090) 
Belarus    -0.753*** -1.532**  -1.361** -3.197***  -3.138*  -1.410  1.041 
  (0.022) (0.510) (0.473) (0.875) (1.559) (2.108) (1.543) 
Unemployment   -0.013  -0.017***  -0.044***  -0.047  -0.034  -0.005 
rate    (0.007) (0.006) (0.014) (0.030) (0.026) (0.017) 
GDP  per  capita    -0.002 -0.004 -0.078 -0.109 -0.103 -0.101 
    (0.039) (0.034) (0.051) (0.083) (0.093) (0.070) 
Inflation     -0.000  -0.000  0.000  -0.001  -0.001  -0.002*** 
    (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
Democracy     -0.092***  -0.096***  -0.150***  -0.135  -0.107  -0.063 
    (0.019) (0.020) (0.048) (0.076) (0.085) (0.074) 
EBRD Transition      0.184*         
Index  (lagged)     (0.098)        
Gini index        -3.780***       
       (0.996)      
Governance          0.640   
Indicators        (0.394)   
Voice  and         -0.725*** 
accountability         (0.174) 
Political  stability         1.159*** 




G o v e r n m e n t            - 0 . 0 8 2  
effectiveness         (0.254) 
Regulatory           0.604*** 
quality         (0.180) 
Rule  of  law         1.153** 
         ( 0 . 4 4 1 )  
C o n t r o l   o f            - 0 . 2 1 6  
c o r r u p t i o n          ( 0 . 2 7 0 )  
Constant  -0.058  1.040  0.499 4.102*** 3.542  2.369  0.567 
  (0.143) (0.856) (0.819) (1.146) (2.178) (2.587) (1.948) 
Observations  72012 72012 72012 48967 40420 40420 40420 
R-squared  0.19 0.19 0.20 0.20 0.21 0.21 0.23 
Notes:   Estimation method: OLS. Standard errors clustered by country are in parentheses. * significant at 10 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; *** significant at 1 




































Table 14: The role of macroeconomic and institutional determinants in explaining the lower support in CIS: Political system 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Czech  Republic  0.568*** 0.465*** 0.456*** 0.319*** 0.409*** 0.412*** 0.571*** 
  (0.025) (0.048) (0.069) (0.056) (0.090) (0.097) (0.100) 
Slovakia  -0.081***  -0.112 -0.114 -0.223 -0.356 -0.349 -0.299 
  (0.015) (0.151) (0.154) (0.235) (0.443) (0.474) (0.285) 
Hungary -0.309***  -0.259**  -0.271*  -0.348*  -0.541  -0.538  -0.490 
  (0.016) (0.113) (0.131) (0.170) (0.341) (0.344) (0.296) 
Poand  0.159***  0.219 0.210 0.283 0.020 0.025 0.105 
  (0.017) (0.203) (0.215) (0.353) (0.465) (0.487) (0.387) 
Estonia    -0.063*  -0.213 -0.219 -0.113 -0.706 -0.702  -1.007** 
  (0.032) (0.263) (0.272) (0.533) (0.834) (0.843) (0.438) 
Lithuania    -0.301***  -0.175 -0.170 -0.015 -0.550 -0.545  -0.870** 
  (0.032) (0.237) (0.235) (0.372) (0.560) (0.578) (0.379) 
Latvia    -0.323***  -0.333 -0.331 -0.293 -0.878 -0.869  -1.328** 
  (0.033) (0.284) (0.282) (0.520) (0.827) (0.853) (0.507) 
Bulgaria    -0.067***  0.009  0.019  -0.032 -0.765 -0.749 -0.743 
  (0.014) (0.300) (0.293) (0.551) (0.914) (0.965) (0.692) 
Romania    0.340***  0.229  0.236  -0.044 -0.782 -0.761 -0.532 
  (0.026) (0.341) (0.335) (0.652) (1.146) (1.181) (0.869) 
Croatia   0.265***  -0.168  -0.167         
 (0.036)  (0.385)  (0.381)         
Russia    -0.676***  -0.859**  -0.851**  -0.868 -1.642 -1.611 -0.082 
  (0.021) (0.335) (0.325) (0.731) (1.172) (1.295) (0.967) 
Ukraine    -0.625***  -0.688 -0.671 -0.966 -1.760 -1.729 -0.998 
  (0.024) (0.449) (0.434) (0.849) (1.452) (1.542) (1.096) 
Belarus    -0.533***  -0.975*  -0.951*  -1.804 -2.122 -2.078 -1.070 
  (0.026) (0.479) (0.453) (1.045) (2.063) (2.194) (1.329) 
Unemployment      -0.011  -0.011 -0.030** -0.040  -0.040  -0.017 
rate    (0.008) (0.008) (0.013) (0.029) (0.027) (0.026) 
GDP  per  capita    0.017  0.017  -0.021 -0.085 -0.085  -0.174* 
    (0.036) (0.037) (0.060) (0.101) (0.101) (0.082) 
Inflation      -0.000*  -0.000*  -0.000 -0.001 -0.001  -0.001** 
    (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) 
Democracy     -0.081***  -0.081***  -0.114**  -0.085  -0.084  -0.083 
    (0.024) (0.025) (0.051) (0.103) (0.105) (0.048) 
EBRD Transition      0.026         
Index  (lagged)     (0.105)        
Gini Index        -2.565***       
       (0.773)      
Governance          0.016   
Indicators        (0.283)   
Voice  and         -0.642*** 
accountability         (0.192) 
Political  stability         0.847*** 




G o v e r n m e n t          - 0 . 2 1 7  
effectiveness         (0.258) 
R e g u l a t o r y            0 . 1 7 3  
quality         (0.206) 
Rule  of  law         1.586*** 
         ( 0 . 4 1 4 )  
C o n t r o l   o f          - 0 . 5 2 1 *  
c o r r u p t i o n          ( 0 . 2 6 3 )  
Constant  0.016 0.627 0.552 2.364 2.672 2.642 2.558 
  (0.123) (0.840) (0.785) (1.454) (2.833) (2.870) (1.966) 
Observations  70532 70532 70532 48165 39666 39666 39666 
R-squared  0.17 0.17 0.17 0.18 0.16 0.16 0.17 
Notes:   Estimation method: OLS. Standard errors clustered by country are in parentheses. * significant at 10 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; *** significant at 1 
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Czech R.        
1991 -11.91  7.10  19.02  -42.65  25.41  68.06 
2004 -7.04  12.64  19.68  -29.01  17.20  46.21 
Slovakia        
1991 15.38  -14.09  -29.47  -5.13  4.90  10.04 
2004 26.83  -6.54  -33.37  6.52  -0.90  -7.43 
Hungary        
1991 21.03  -11.99  -33.01  3.81  7.50  3.69 
2004 30.99  -4.15  -35.14  15.57  8.76  -6.81 
Poland       
1991 -6.35  -20.02  -13.67  -21.00  0.23  21.23 
2004 22.28  -2.29  -24.57  0.30  1.27  0.97 
Slovenia        
1991 -6.12  -32.21  -26.08  -6.74  3.50  10.25 
2004  32.43 11.66 -20.76 22.48 19.69  -2.78 
Estonia        
1993 25.27  -6.38  -31.65  3.73  6.10  2.38 
2004  30.53 30.08  -0.44 13.23 23.07  9.85 
Latvia        
1993 23.79  -26.16  -49.95  1.55  -4.28  -5.83 
2004 30.23  -1.03  -31.26  6.93  0.86  -6.06 
Lithuania        
1993 40.61  -26.71  -67.32  10.30  0.57  -9.73 
2004  38.58 20.97 -17.61 16.45 20.91  4.45 
Bulgaria        
1991 0.12  -23.44  -23.56  -23.97  26.73  50.70 
2004 42.25  -12.99  -55.24  29.90  -0.40  -30.30 
Romania        
1991 -3.49  -14.12  -10.63  -37.16  21.78  58.94 
2004 24.76  -4.12  -28.88  -1.51  3.52  5.03 
Croatia        
1992 -19.02  -25.35  -6.32  -41.85  -10.31  31.55 
1998 5.42  -26.87  -32.29  -10.32  -21.55  -11.23 
Russia       
1992 15.61  -50.95  -66.57  4.29  -42.15  -46.44 
2004 41.02  -3.32  -44.35  30.59  5.35  -25.24 
Ukraine        
1992 29.61  -60.46  -90.06  6.09  -18.43  -24.51 
2004 40.44  1.25  -39.18  20.10  17.81  -2.29 
Belarus        
1991  45.08 -37.59 -82.67 23.85 -25.56 -49.41 
2004  34.56 24.33 -10.23 17.05 22.46  5.41 
Summary 
    Economic system  Political system 
No. of countries 
with average 
response: 
Past Present  Past  Present   
Negative 5  13  7  5 
Positive 
1991/3 
9 1  7  9 
Negative 1  8  3  3 
Positive 
2004 
13 6  11  11 









Table A2: Sample size by country 
  1991 1992 1993 1995 1996 1998 2000 2001 2004 Total 
Bulgaria  892 0  1035  1043  0 766 0  1086  1130  5952 
Czech Republic  611  1187  998  822  0  0  0  0  768  4386 
Slovakia  264  522  458  932 0 777 0  0 848  3801 
Hungary  756 594 818 876  0  0  0  650 474  4168 
Poland  941 962 763 819  0  0  0  629 590  4704 
Romania  949  956  0 0 0  1043  0 0  792  3740 
Croatia  0  982  989  0 0 0 0 0 0  1971 
Slovenia  835 0 810  631 0 610 0  0 753  3639 
Belarus  0  0 874  888 0 959 0  0 713  3434 
Ukraine  0 624  816  834 0 801 0  0  1578  4653 
Russia  0  1974 1741 1765 2310 1544 1686 1821 1820  14661 
Estonia  0  0  1474  1053  839  0  593 826 721  5506 
Latvia  0  0  1346  855 729  0  648 732 769  5079 
Lithuania  0  0  1688 766  855  0  960 1059 990 6318 
Total  5248 7801  13810  11284  4733 6500 3887 6803  11946  72012 
Source: Authors’ tabulations form the New Barometer data.  
Notes: finals sample includes respondents with non-missing information on the key explanatory variables (as 
well as support for economic reforms).  
 
Table A3: Variables definitions and sources 















Distance between present and past. Constructed as a difference between the 
individual ranking of the functioning of the present economy (political system) 
and past social economy (political system). It ranges from -200 and +200 and is 
treated as continuous. 
 
Binary mutually exclusive variables defining whether individual belongs to a 
specific group based on his evaluations of past and present economic (political) 
systems.  
 


































Dummy variable equals to 1 if female 
 
Dummy indicating if individual’s age is less than 30 years old (Reference 
category) 
Dummy indicating if individual’s age is greater than 30 and less than 39 years 
old 
Dummy indicating if individual’s age is greater than 40 and less than 49 years 
old 
Dummy indicating if individual’s age is greater than 50 and less than 59 years 
old 
Dummy indicating if individual’s age is greater than 60 years old 
 
Dummy indicating if an individual has elementary education (Reference category) 
 
Dummy indicating if an individual has secondary or vocational education 
 
 
Dummy indicating if an individual has university degree 
 
Dummy indicating if an individual is married or cohabiting (Reference category) 
 
Dummy indicating if an individual is single 
 






















Student or housewife 
 
 


















Number of weeks with 

































Return to Communism 
 
Dummy indicating if an individual resides in a small town or rural area (with 
population less or equal to 5000; in Russia <20000) (Reference category) 
 
Dummy indicating if an individual resides in a big town (with population greater 
than 5000 and less than 100000; in Russia – between 20000 and 1000000) 
 
Dummy indicating if an individual resides in a city including capital (with 
population >100000; in Russia >1000000) 
 
Dummy indicating if an individual is employed (full-time part-time family helper 
apprentice or self-employed including and working pensioners in some countries) 
 
Dummy indicating if an individual is unemployed (including both with and without 
benefits in Russia) 
 
Dummy indicating if an individual is a pensioner 
 
Dummy indicating if an individual is a house-keeper or a student since in several 
countries it was not possible to disentangle these two categories.  
 
Dummy indicating if household is in the first quartile of the country-specific 
income distribution (Reference category) 
 
Dummy indicating if household is in the second quartile of the country-specific 
income distribution 
 
Dummy indicating if household is in the third quartile of the country-specific 
income distribution 
 
Dummy indicating if household is in the fourth quartile of the country-specific 
income distribution 
 
Dummy indicating if an individual belongs to an ethnic minority in a country (in 
the Baltic States) 
 
Number of weeks during which a person was either unemployed or salary was 
delayed or not paid in full last year (1993, 1995, 1996, 1998) 
 
Destitution scale constructed by sociologists and political scientists indicates a 
degree of hardship (increasing from 0 to 9) based on the information whether a 
person or his family had to live without food heating electricity or clothes (1993 – 
2001)    
 
Dummy indicating whether an individual thinks that reforms in his country are 
being conducted at the right speed (Reference category) (1995, 1996)  
 
Dummy indicating whether an individual thinks that reforms in his country are 
going too fast (1995, 1996) 
 
Dummy indicating whether an individual thinks that reforms in his country are 
going too slow (1995, 1996) 
 
Dummy indicating whether an individual would approve if the Parliament was 
suspended (1991 - 2004) 
 
Dummy that equals 1 if an individual agrees with the statement: it would be 
better to get rid of Parliament and elections and have a strong leader (1992-
2004) 
 
Dummy that that equals 1 if an individual think that most or almost all “public 
officials are engaged in bribe-taking and corruption” in his country and equals 
zero if he thinks that “very few” or “less than half public officials are corrupt” 
(2001, 2004). 
 
Dummy that equals 1 if an individual agrees with the statement that “incomes 
should be made more equal so there is no big difference in income” as opposed 
to the statement “Individual achievement should determine how much people are 
paid” (1992, 1993, 1995, 1998, 2004) 
 
Dummy equals 1 if an individual agrees with the statement “We should return to 



























































Dummy equals 1 if an individual or his family were members of the Communist 
party (1993, 1995, 1998) 
 
Variable indicating a degree of individual’s trust in political parties (ranges from 1 
to 7) (1992-2004) 
 
Variable indicating a degree of individual’s trust in Parliament (ranges from 1 to 
7) (1992-2004) 
 
Variable indicating a degree of individual’s trust in President (ranges from 1 to 7) 
(1993-2004) 
 
Variable indicating a degree of individual’s trust in people of his country (ranges 
from 1 to 7) (1998-2004) 
 








Unemployment rate (Source: EBRD. For Belarus the data are from IMF 
International Financial Statistics CD Rom for Ukraine – from World Development 
Indicators CD Rom for Estonia in 1990 and 1991 – from the World Development 
Indicators online database) 
 
GDP per capita PPP (constant 2000 international $) (Source: World Development 
Indicators online database) 
 
Inflation GDP deflator (annual percent) (Source: World Development Indicators 
online database) 
 
Average of EBRD indicators of the progress in transition lagged one year 
(Source: EBRD 2007) 
 
Hospital beds per 1000 of people in a country (Source: World Development 
Indicators CD Rom) 
 
Gini index (Source: Transmonee dataset. For Bulgaria Czech Republic Estonia 
Latvia Lithuania Ukraine Croatia and Belarus 1990 is used instead of 1991. In 
Latvia 1997 is used instead of 1995 and 2000 instead of 2001. For Lithuania 
1996 is used instead of 1995. For Russia instead of 1993 use 1994. For Slovakia 
instead of 1995 use 1996. For Slovenia and Ukraine instead of 2004 use 2002. 
 
Democracy Indicator which is an additive eleven-point scale (0-10) (Source: 
Polity IV) 
 
Average of the World Bank Governance Indicators (Source: 
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/sc_chart.asp ). They include the 
following six indicators: 
  Voice and Accountability / Political Stability / Government Effectiveness /  
  Regulatory Quality / Rule of Law / Control of Corruption. 
































Czech R.                
1991 2.11 4.10  13.27 15  36  0.19  8  .  71.90 
1995 3.30 4.02  14.27 70  17  0.22  10  0.86  73.07 
1998 3.48 6.45  14.68 75  11  0.21  10  0.76  74.42 
2004 3.74 8.40  17.53 80  4 0.23  10  0.75  75.72 
Slovakia               
1991 2.11 9.53  9.59  15  35  .  8  .  70.88 
1995 3.11  13.10  9.54  60  10  0.24  7  0.43  72.25 
1998 3.22  12.49  11.24 75  5 0.26  9  0.47  72.57 
2004 3.67  17.10  13.43 80  6 0.25  9  0.73  73.96 
Hungary               
1991 2.37 8.22  10.42 30  36  0.21  10  .  69.38 
1995 3.48  10.17  10.54 60  27  0.24  10  0.73  69.79 
1998 3.78 7.80  11.78 80  13  0.25  10  0.90  70.56 
2004 3.89 6.31  15.55 80  4 0.27  10  0.91  72.65 
Poland               
1991 2.41  12.25  6.95  40  55  0.26  8  .  70.59 
1995 3.22  14.94  8.25  60  41  0.32  9  0.66  71.89 
1998 3.52  11.00  9.84  65  11  0.33  9  0.72  73.00 
2004 3.66  18.20  12.17 75  4 0.37  10  0.51  74.49 
Slovenia               
1991 1.89 7.30  12.71 20  95  0.26  10  .  73.35 
1995 2.93 7.35  13.57 50  25  0.25  10  0.95  73.44 
1998 3.22 7.84  15.39 60  7 0.25  10  1.06  74.77 
2004 3.37 6.48  19.09 65  3 0.24  10  0.98  76.57 
Estonia               
1993 2.70 6.56  6.39  40  85  .  7  .  67.96 
1995 3.15 9.71  6.83  65  31  0.40  7  0.66  67.85 
2001 3.70  12.58  10.15 75  5 0.38  7  0.96  70.51 
2004 3.81 9.65  12.83 80  2 0.38  7  1.04  71.57 
Latvia               
1993 2.26 8.73  5.49  30  54  .  8  .  66.72 
1995 2.81  18.05  5.71  55  28  0.33  8  0.19  66.39 
2001 3.29  13.10  8.66  65  2 0.33  8  0.63  70.10 
2004 3.56  10.40  10.96 70  7 0.39  8  0.68  71.45 
Lithuania               
1993 2.44 4.36  7.24  35  306  .  10  .  68.91 
1995 2.85  17.54  6.84  65  49  0.35  10  0.31  69.01 
2001 3.37  17.36  9.35  70  0 0.35  10  0.72  71.61 
2004 3.52  11.38  11.99 75  3 0.31  10  0.79  71.92 
Bulgaria               
1991 1.70  10.52  6.17  20  227  0.23  8  .  71.56 
1995 2.33  13.69  6.07  50  63  0.38  8  -0.29  71.05 
1998 2.81  15.97  5.49  65  24  0.34  8  0.07  71.06 
2004 3.37  12.03  7.68  75  5 0.36  9  0.24  72.36 
Romania               
1991 1.26 3.03  5.90  25  195  0.26  5  .  69.78 
1995 2.41 9.52  6.22  45  35  0.31  5  -0.13  69.46 
1998 2.89 6.32  5.83  60  55  0.30  8  0.00  69.30 
2004 3.22 6.30  7.73  70  15  0.36  9  0.01  71.31 
Croatia               
1992 1.93  13.20  7.47  .  595  .  1  .  71.24 
1995 2.70  14.50  7.43  .  5  .  0  -0.25  72.08 
1998 3.04  11.40  8.94  .  8 0.35  0  -0.09  72.50 
Russia                
1992 1.89 5.29  8.32  25  1490 .  6  .  66.87 
1995 2.59 9.20  6.39  55  144  0.44  5  -0.67  65.22 
1998 2.55  11.90  5.96  70  19  0.45  5  -0.67  66.78 
2004 2.96 7.60  9.02  70  20  .  7  -0.63  65.21 
Ukraine                  
1992 1.19 0.40  7.25  10  1761 .  6  .  68.88 
1995 2.19 5.60  4.26  45  416  0.47  7  -0.52  67.12 
1998 2.48  11.30  3.75  55  12  0.31  7  -0.70  67.97 
2004 2.81 8.60  5.89  65  15  0.33  6  -0.62  68.19 
Belarus               
1992 1.26 0.50  4.74  .  1074 .  7  .  70.02 
1995 2.00 2.50  3.47  .  661  0.25  3  -1.09  68.46 
1998 1.52 2.40  4.36  .  77  0.25  0  -0.82  68.41 
2004 1.81 2.50  6.42  .  23  0.25  0  -1.08  68.39 






Figure A1: GDP per capita and support for change in the economic system  
 
   
   
Source: authors’ tabulations based on the data from the New Barometers and World Development Indicators. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 